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Abstract
This thesis is about weak islands. Weak islands are contexts that are transparent to some
but not all operator-variable dependencies. For this reason, they are also sometimes called
selective islands. Some paradigmatic cases of weak island violations include the
ungrammatical examples involving manner and degree extraction in (1)a and (2)a, as
opposed to the acceptable questions about individuals in (1)b and (2)b:
(1) a. *How does John regret that he fixed the car?
b. Who does John regret that he invited to the party?
(2) a. *How much milk haven't you spilled on your shirt?
b. Which girl haven't you introduced to Mary?
The main questions that an account of weak islands should address are the following:
* What contexts create weak islands and why?
+ Which expressions are sensitive to weak islands and why?
* Why do weak islands sometimes improve?
This thesis develops a semantic account for weak islands, whose core idea can be
summarized as follows. What sets apart the expressions that are sensitive to weak islands
from the ones that are not is that in the case of the former the domain of quantification is
such that its elements stand in a particular logical relationship with each other. The island
creating contexts are those in which this property of the island-sensitive expressions leads
to a problem, namely a contradiction. This contradiction might manifest itself in one of
two forms: In some cases, the question will presuppose that that a number of mutually
incompatible alternatives is true at the same time, therefore it will necessarily lead to a
presupposition failure in any context. In other cases, the presupposition that there be a
complete answer will not be met in any context, because the domain of question
alternatives will always contain at least two alternatives that have to-but cannot-be
ruled out at the same time.
The present proposal therefore fits in the family of proposals (most importantly
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), Honcoop (1998), Rullmann (1995), Fox and Hackl (2005))
which argue that it is independently necessary principles of semantic composition that
lead to the oddness of weak islands, rather than abstract syntactic locality constraints. As
such, it provides a further piece of evidence against the view which holds that principles
governing the well-formedness of sentences necessarily belong to the realm of syntax as
we know it. However, when we will examine the nature of the contradiction that arises in
the cases of weak island violations, we will observe that it is only a special type of
contradiction-identified by Gajewski (2002) as L-analytic-which leads to
ungrammaticality: namely one that results from the logical constants of the sentence
alone. In this sense the violation that can be observed might be argued to be "syntactic":
it can be read from the logical form of the sentences.
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Chapter 1
Weak Islands and Contradiction
1. Introduction
The central claim of this thesis is that weak islands are unacceptable because they lead to
a contradiction. This can come about in one of two ways:
i. The constraint that questions have a unique most informative answer is not met:
therefore any complete answer is bound to state a contradiction.
ii. The question presupposes a set of propositions that are contradictory.
In more intuitive terms we might say that it is a felicity condition on asking a question
that the speaker might assume that the hearer is in a position to know the complete
answer. But when there cannot be a maximal answer to a question, any potential
complete answer amounts to the statement of a contradiction. Therefore, no hearer can be
in the position to know the complete answer, and as a consequence the question cannot be
asked. When the question presupposes a contradiction, it cannot be asked in any context.
1.1. The Maximal Informativeness Hypothesis
The first type of problem finds its antecedents in the proposals of Dayal (1996), Beck and
Rullmann (1999), Fox and Hackl (2005). Dayal (1996) in particular has argued that a
question presupposes that a member of its Karttunen-denotation entails all other
members, in other words, that there is a single most informative true member among the
true alternative answers in the Hamblin-denotation. This condition is similar to the more
familiar condition on the use of a definite description, which is only possible if the
extension of the common noun that the definite article combines with has a maximal
element. Fox and Hackl (2005) argue in turn that the maximality condition that Dayal
(1996) proposes is never met in the case of negative degree questions. This for them
follows from the hypothesis that the set of degrees relevant for the semantics of degree
constructions is always dense (UDM). Given then that these questions can never have a
most informative true answer, (i.e. they can never have a maximal true answer that entails
all the other true answers) they will be unacceptable as a presupposition failure.
What I will adopt from the above proposals is that questions are unacceptable if they
do not have a most informative answer, i.e. no true answer entails all the other true ones.
I will call this condition of Dayal (1996)'s the Maximal Informativeness Hypothesis. If
there is no maximal element in the Karttunen denotation of a question, then for any
element in the Karttunen denotation, the assertion that it is the complete true answer will
be a contradiction. I will use these two ways of stating the problem interchangeably.
1.2. Contradictory presuppositions
The second reason why weak islands might lead to a contradiction is that they might
stand with a set of presuppositions that are incoherent. As no context can entail a
contradictory set of presuppositions, potential complete answers to such questions will be
doomed to be presupposition failures. Therefore, such questions will be judged as
ungrammatical. Similar reasoning about contradictory presuppositions leading to
ungrammaticality was proposed e.g. in Heim (1984), Krifka (1995), Zucchi (1995),
Lahiri (1998), Guerzoni (2003), Abrusan (2007). In our case, the contradictory
presuppositions arise because the relevant questions contain a presupposition trigger of a
certain form: one that presupposes the truth of its complement. Given the observation that
presuppositions embedded in questions project in a universal fashion, such questions will
presuppose a set of propositions. In the case of weak island-sensitive extractees, I will
argue, this set will necessarily be incoherent.
1.3. Extractees and interveners
I will further argue that the felicity condition on asking a question that there be a
complete answer has the power to predict which elements will be bad extractees, as well
as which contexts create weak island intervention in the following way:
i. The contexts that constitute weak islands are those in the case of which we run
into a contradiction with some but not other extractees.
ii. The difference between the good and the bad extractees in the weak island
creating environments is that in the case of bad extractees, the complete answer is
always incoherent. This is not true however in the case of good extractees.
As will become evident in the course of the discussion, the above two conditions are but
two sides of the same coin. The extractees that are sensitive to weak islands are special in
that their domain is such that it contains atoms that are not independent of each other. As
a consequence, the truth of an (atomic) proposition in the Hamblin-denotation has
consequences for the truth of other atomic propositions in the Hamblin-denotation. This
property however will, in some contexts, lead to a situation in which no complete answer
can be found. These contexts are the contexts that create weak islands.
1.4 On contradiction
I have proposed above that the reason for the ungrammaticality of weak islands follows
from the fact that all of their possible complete answers express a contradiction. But why
does this fact lead to ungrammaticality? We are after all perfectly capable of expressing
contradictory or nonsensical sentences, without them being ungrammatical: this was in
fact the point behind Chomsky's famous example Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
However, it seems that we need to distinguish between contradiction that results from
non-logical arguments, from a contradiction that results from the logical constants alone.
Gajewski (2002) argues that the second in fact plays an important role for natural
language: he argues that sentences that express a contradiction or tautology by virtue of
their logical constants are ungrammatical. The present proposal falls under Gajewski
(2002)'s generalization in that it proposes that the weak island violations lead to a
contradiction independently of the particular choice of variables.
1.5. Preview of this chapter
In the remainder of this chapter I will introduce the concepts discussed above in much
greater detail. In Section 2 I discuss the semantics of questions about plural individuals,
introducing Dayal (1996)'s Maximal Informativeness Hypothesis along the way. Section
3 spells out the assumptions about the nature of projection of presuppositional items
embedded in questions. Section 4 discusses Gajewski (2002)'s condition about analytical
sentences in further detail. Section 5 introduces the puzzle of weak islands in greater
detail, listing the basic examples for easier further reference, as well as providing a
preview of the chapters that will follow.
2 Questions about (plural) individuals
In this section I first briefly review the semantics of plurals and plural definite
descriptions along with some concepts that will be useful later in this dissertation, and
then turn to the explication of the semantics of positive and negative questions about
plural individuals.
2.1 Plurals: An ordering and a designated element: the maximum
2.1.1 An ordering
Following the work of Link (1983) and many others it is commonly assumed that the
domain of quantification over individuals is not simply a set of atomic individuals, but a
set of individuals with a partial ordering: the domain of individuals is ordered by a part-of
relation. Plural individuals are those that have other individuals as parts, singular
individuals have only themselves as parts. A plural NP such as John and Mary denotes
the plural individual that is the sum of the singular individuals John and Mary.
(1) D--p *(At), for some set At
i. For every set X, let V(X) be the collection of all subsets of X
ii. p*(X)=p(X)\ { 0)
(2) Singular individuals denote atoms, plural individuals denote sums of atoms
(3) The proper part relation (C) and sum ( u) are defined as usual
(4) We will simplify assuming that {a}=a (this is known as "Quine's innovation")1
The structure that we thus arrive at is now a free i-join semilattice. These structures can
be visualized as follows:
(5)
{a,b,c}
{a,b} {a,c} {c,b}
W c
Where:
i. {a, b} c {a, b, c}
ii. a c {a, b}
2.1.2 Singular and plural NPs
How are singular and plural NPs represented in this structure? A singular NP denotes the
set of atomic individuals that are in the extension of the NP. A plural NP can in principle
be represented in two ways, and in fact both of these options have been proposed in the
literature. We could say that plural common count nouns like boys are true of pluralities,
i.e. non-singular sets of boys (this is e.g. the position assumed by Chierchia (1998))
Now, if, in a given model, the extension of the singular noun boy is { a, b, c }, then that of
boys is {{a,b}, {a,c}, {b,c}, {a,b,c}}.
(6) [boys] = * [boyJ \At
' cf. Schwarzschild (1996) e.g. on this point.
The second approach to plurals in this framework assumes that plural common count
nouns like boys are true of pluralities and singularities. That is, if the extension of boy is
{a, b, c}, then that of boys is {a, b, c, {a,b}, {a,c}, {b,c}, {a,b,c }. (cf, Landman (1989)
Landman (1991), Krifka (1989) and Schwarzschild (1996) Spector (2007) ) In other
words, Boy denotes a set of atoms, and boys denotes the i-join semilattice generated by
[boy].
(7) [boys] = g* [boy]
(8) the extension of the predicate is indicated by x-es below:
Boy Boys
X
xx x x
x x x x x x
For the sake of concreteness, it is this second position that I will be assuming throughout
this chapter; though as far as I can see it does not have any significant bearing on our
issues.
2.1.3 The maximum
Above we have said that boy denotes a set of atoms, and boys denotes the i-join
semilattice generated by [boy]. It seems however that natural language also makes
reference to a special element in this structure: the maximum. Sharvy (1980) proposes
that the boys denotes precisely this special element: the maximal element of the set of all
boys. The iota operator can be used to interpret the definite article: when it applies to the
extension of a plural noun like boys, it refers to the largest plurality in that extension.
(9) [tx. P(x)l= u[P] if u[P]Ie IPI; undefined otherwise
i.e. tx. P(x) is only defined if [P] forms itself an i-join semilattice, and
then tx. P(x) is the maximal element of [P).
(10) [the boysl = tx [ xe boysj]
When the iota operator applies to a set of singularities there are two things that can
happen: if a singular predicate has more than one object in its extension, the maximum
will not be defined. If, on the other hand, the singular predicate has only one element in
its extension, the iota operator picks out this object. This is how the singularity
presupposition of the definite determiner is accounted for.
2.1.4 Distributivity
In the framework introduced above, singular and plural individuals are treated in the
same way: There is no ontological difference between denotations of singular terms like
the boy and a plural term like the boys. The reason for this is that Link (1983) wanted to
provide an analysis to collective and distributive readings of plurals, but keeping a
common representation for definite plurals. The solution was to assign them groups as
denotation. (Following Schwarzschild (1996), among others, I have been representing
groups as sets). Now, if e.g. the sum of John and Bill is an individual on its own right,
this plural individual can be in the extension of a predicate like meet, without it being the
case that the individuals making up the plural individual would be necessarily in the
extension of the predicate as well. Thus, it does not follow from the truth of Bill and John
met that #Bill met or that #John met. Similarly, a sentence such as The lamp and the box
are heavy might be true in a context, even if neither the lamp nor the box themselves are
heavy.
The question that arises though is how can we deal with distributive predicates,
i.e. predicates that seem to be true of the individuals that make up the plurality in
question, e.g. blond or intelligent. The solution of Link (1983) is to apply a distributive
operator to a predicate:
(11) Dist (P)(x)=l iffP(x)=l or Vy [ye x-)P(y)=l]
Now, even though a predicate such as intelligent might be undefined for a plurality, it can
still be true for a plurality under a distributive operator:
(12) a. [intelligent] ({Bill, Mary}) is undefined
b. [intelligentl ({Bill}) =1; [intelligent] ({Mary}) =1
c. Dist ([intelligent]) ({Bill, Maryl) =1
2.1.5 Homogeneity
It has been noted since Fodor (1970) that definite plurals give rise to "all or nothing"
effects: e.g. an utterance such as I didn't see the boys gives rise to an inference that I did
not see any of the boys. This is shown e.g. by the oddness of continuations such as below.
Notice the contrast with the universal quantifier:
(13) I didn't see the boys. #But I did see some of them
(14) I didn't see all the boys. But I did see some of them.
(15) Are the boys we met orphans? #No, some of them are.
(16) Are all the boys we met orphans? No, some of them are.
Fodor (1970) therefore proposes that definite plurals trigger an all or none
presupposition. Libner (1985, (2000) extends this view to propose that the all-or-none
presupposition is a presupposition that holds of all predications, including examples such
as John painted the table, where we seem to infer that John painted the whole table:
(17) Presupposition of Indivisibility :
Whenever a predicate is applied to one of its arguments, it is true or false of the
argument as a whole.
Libner, in effect, incorporates this presupposition (a.k.a. the Homogeneity
presupposition) into the meaning of the distributive operator:
(18) Dist (P)=kx: [Vyc x P(y)] or [Vycx --P(y)]. VyEx P(y)
Given this new distributive operator, a sentence such as I didn't see the boys interpreted
distributively will presuppose that I either saw all the boys or I did not see any of them,
and it will assert that it is false that I saw each of the boys. The combination of the
presupposition and the assertion results in the inference that I did not see any of the boys.
In other words, via the homogeneity presupposition, -(A A B) is strengthened into (-A A
-,B). Since Libner (1985) the homogeneity presupposition is widely assumed to be an
important aspect of the distributivity operator, cf. e.g. the work of [Schwarzschild, 1993
#62], Beck (2001), Gajewski (2005), among others.
2.2. Questions about (Plural) Individuals
We have seen above that the domain of individuals is commonly assumed to be a
partially ordered set. Expressions in natural language such as singular and plural common
nouns, and definite noun phrases denote different elements/parts of this structure. Now I
will turn to denotations of questions about individuals, and show that there is a sense in
which we can think of the denotation of questions as denoting an ordered set.
2.2.1 Hamblin and plurals: an ordering
According to Hamblin (1973) questions denote sets of propositions, namely the set of
possible answers. A question about individuals such as (19)a has the denotation as in
(19)b, informally represented in (19)c:
(19) a. Which man came?
b. Xp3x [man(x)(w) A p=Aw. came (w)(x)]
c. {that John came, that Bill came, that Fred came..}
The above example is singular. However we could also allow the wh-word to range over
both singular and plural individuals, as shown in (20):
(20) a. Which men came?
b. Xp3x [man*(x)(w) A p=Aw. came (w)(x)]
c. {that John came, that Bill came, that Fred came, that John &Bill
came, that John& Fred came... etc}
Recall now that in a system like that of Link (1983) a plural individual is an individual on
its own right. Therefore the question alternatives denote distinct propositions, and are not
ordered by entailment. (This can be easily seen e.g. in the case if the predicate was
collective.) Still, if the predicates that apply to the plural individuals are interpreted
distributively, we get an ordering of the propositions (by entailment) in the Hamblin
denotation: this is because John and Bill came, understood distributively, means that John
came and Bill came. Therefore a proposition such as John & Bill cameD (where the
subscript D signals that the predicate is to be understood distributively) entails the
propositions that John came, and that Bill came. Because of distributivity then, the
propositions in the Hamblin set of (20) are ordered by set inclusion. This will give us the
same structure for the propositions in the question's Hamblin-denotation that we saw
above for the individuals: a free join semilattice.
2.2.2 Karttunen
We can also define sub-lattices in our ordered Hamblin denotation. E.g. we could define
the set of true answers: This gives us Karttunen (1977)'s question denotation. Karttunen
(1977) has observed that (21)b entails that for every man who came, John knows that
they came. If the question denotes the set of true propositions, this inference follows as a
consequence from the question denotation itself.
(21) a. Which men came?
b. John knows which man came
c. [which man came]= Xp3x [(p(w) A man(w)(x) A p=Ahw came (w)(x)]
While the above meaning has been famously shown to be too weak in the complement of
know by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), Heim (1994) and Beck and Rullmann (1999)
defend it for certain other predicates (e.g. surprise, predict).
2.2.3 The maximal answer: Dayal (1996), Jacobson (1995)
Given the sub-lattice of true answers to a question about plural individuals, we can define
the maximal element among these true propositions. Dayal (1996) and Jacobson (1995)
have proposed exactly this. More precisely, Dayal (1996) has proposed to distinguish a
question (which is a set of possible answers) from the Answer, which is the maximal true
proposition. The answer operator (Ans) in Dayal (1996)'s system has a very similar
function to a definite determiner; it picks the maximum of the true answers under
entailment: 2
(22) Ans (Q)=tp[pe Q A p(w)]
Since the Answer operator outputs a single proposition, this view of question-meaning is
compatible with the proposal of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) according to which
questions denote propositions, instead of sets of propositions.
What we have seen in the previous sections is that given a partially ordered set of
potential answers to a question about (singular and plural) individuals (=the Hamblin
(1973) denotation of the question) we can define a sub-lattice of the true answers (=the
Karttunen (1977) denotation of the question) and take the maximum of this set (=the
most informative true answer by Dayal (1996) and Jacobson (1995)). This view of
question meanings follows the footsteps of Heim (1994) and Beck and Rullmann (1999)
2 Jacobson (1995) proposes that questions do not have to denote sets of propositions, rather, the embedded
question can denote the unique proposition such that there exists some entity X such that p is true and the
denotation of the wh-constituent is true of X:
(1) a. WH-Q
b. Q'=tp [3X(p(w) A p=WH(w)(X)]
in assuming that natural language allows a certain flexibility as to which parts of the
Hamblin-structure are used in various contexts.
2.2.4 The complete answer
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) have famously argued that Karttunen (1977)'s semantics
for questions makes too weak predictions in embedded contexts. The Karttunen
denotation of a question is the collection of all the true answers. [Alternatively a maximal
answer in the sense of Dayal (1996), Jacobson (1995) is the unique answer that is true
and entails all the other true answers]. The question meaning that Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1984) have argued for is a strengthened version of a maximal answer: It stands
with the inference that the alternatives that are not entailed are false.
* Maximal answer (=the)
(equivalent to a weakly exhaustive answer, or Ansl of Heim (1994))
(23) Ans (Q)(w)=tp[pE Q A p(w)]
* Complete answer (=only)
(equivalent to a strongly exhaustive answer, or Ans2 of Heim (1994))
(24) Exh (Q)(w) = tp [p(w) & Vp' Q [pgp' --- ip'(w)]]
In the case of matrix questions, when we assert a maximal answer, it is strengthened into
a complete answer. For the sake of concreteness, I will assume here (extending Fox
(2006)) that this strengthening is done by an operator in the syntax (although I believe
whether it is done in the syntax or in the semantics is ultimately immaterial to the present
proposal). [However, following Heim (1994) and Beck and Rullmann (1999) I will
assume that certain verbs that embed questions can select for the first type of answer
lexically.]
2.2.5 An example: positive and negative questions about individuals
Let's look at examples of a positive and a negative question about (plural) individuals.
The first example is that of a positive question about plural individuals. The Hamblin-
denotation of the question in (25) is the set of alternative propositions that might be the
answers to the question.
(25) a. Who/Which men came?
b. Xp3x [man*(w)(x) A p=Aw. came (w)(x)]
c. {John came, Bill came, John+Bill came, Roger came...)
The set of possible answers contains propositions about both singular and plural
individuals. If the predicate is understood distributively, the alternatives will be partially
ordered. If e.g. it is the case that John and Bill came, the maximal true answer is the
proposition that John+Bill came, and the propositions that John came and that Bill came
are entailed by it.
Since it will be important for the chapter on negative islands, let's look at an
example of a negative question about plural individuals in some detail as well:
(26) jjWho did you not invite?lj
=kp3x [man*(w)(x) A p=Ahw. you did not invite (w)(x)]
={that you did not invite Bill; that you did not invite Bill+Sue; that you
did not invite Mary +Sue; etc. }
Notice that in this case the alternatives can contain both plural and singular individuals.
What kind of entailment relationships exist among these propositions? Recall that
predication over plurals seems to give rise to "all-or-nothing" effects: John did not invite
the girls has the reading that he invited none of the girls, and, importantly, lacks the
reading that he invited some but not all the girls. As we have above, this pattern is
standardly derived by equipping the distributivity operator with a homogeneity
presupposition. (cf. e.g. LUbner (1985), Schwarzschild (1993), Beck (2001), Gajewski
(2005)) Because of the homogeneity presupposition then, a negative proposition that
predicates over a plural individual X in the answer set in (26) will entail all the negative
propositions over the singularities xeX. E.g. the proposition that you did not invite
Bill+Sue will entail that you did not invite Bill and that you did not invite Sue.
Suppose now that our domain includes three individuals: Bill, Sue and John, and
we indeed select that you did not invite Bill+Sue as our most informative true answer to
(26). Now we know that no other proposition in the Hamblin set is true. Let's represent
the Hamblin set with the following diagram:
(27)
{ s,bj
-{{s,b} -,sj} 1 j,b}
s -7b 
-j
Since we know that the proposition that you did not invite John is not true in w, and we
know that John exists in w and is part of our relevant domain, we will infer that indeed
you did invite John. Similarly, take the proposition that you did not invite Sue and John.
By the homogeneity presupposition, this will entail that you invited neither of Sue or
John-which we now know to be not true in the world. But we also know that you indeed
did not invite Sue, therefore this conjunction can only be false if you did in fact invite
John. This is how we derive the positive inference of a complete answer to a negative
question, namely the inference that other than Sue and Bill, you invited everyone in a
given domain.
2.3. The Maximal Informativeness Hypothesis
Let's now turn to he following example discussed by Dayal (1996):
(28) a. Which man came?
b. Xp3x [man(x)(w) A p=Aw. came (x) in w]
c. {John came, Bill came, Peter came...}
In the above example which man is a singular noun phrase, and therefore it restricts the
domain of quantification to atomic men. Therefore the question in (28) denotes a set of
atomic propositions. Of course, in principle many of these alternative propositions could
be true. However, the answer operator is looking for a maximally true proposition in this
set. If there are more true singular propositions, their maximum is not defined and
therefore the answer operator will not be defined either. The answer operator will only
give an answer if the set of possible answers only contains one true answer: this will be at
the same time the maximal true answer. This is how Dayal (1996) derives the uniqueness
presupposition on individuals with singular Wh-words.
Thus we have seen a nice example of the Maximal Informativeness Hypothesis at
work. Another approach that uses this condition is Fox and Hackl (2005), which will be
reviewed in the next chapter. The present proposal follows this trait inasmuch as it claims
that the oddness of certain weak islands is to be explained as an instance of violating the
presupposition that there be a maximally informative answer. I will argue that in the case
of extractees that create weak islands there will always be at least two alternatives among
the set of alternatives that need to be ruled out given the strong exhaustive reading of the
answer, yet cannot be ruled out at the same time.
3 On contradictory presuppositions
As I have stated in the introduction of the present chapter, the reason why there can be no
complete answer to a question containing certain presuppositional items is that any
potential complete answer will carry a set of presuppositions that are incoherent. As no
context can entail a contradictory set of presuppositions, potential complete answers to
such questions will not be assertable in any context. Therefore, such questions will be
judged as ungrammatical. (For other approaches that proposed that contradictory
presuppositions leading to ungrammaticality cf. Heim (1984), Krifka (1995), Zucchi
(1995), Lahiri (1998), Guerzoni (2003), Abels (2004), Abrusan (2007))
3.1 Presuppositions embedded in questions project universally
Heim (1983) and more recently Schlenker (2006a) and Schlenker (2007) have argued that
quantified sentences trigger a universal presupposition (29).3 In the case of a quantifier
such as no one, e.g. this prediction indeed seems to be borne out: (30):
3 But cf. Beaver (1994) for different view on the projection of presuppositions from quantified sentences, as
well as Chemla (2007) for a discussion of empirical differences among various quantifiers.
(29) Quantified sentence: [Q:R(x)]Sp(x)
presupposition: [Vx: R(x)] p(x)
(30) None of these ten people knows that his mother is a spy
presupposition: all of these 10 people's mother is a spy
As questions are quantificational structures, this approach predicts that presuppositions
should project from questions in a universal fashion as well. It seems that indeed this
prediction is indeed born out: the following examples show that the projection behavior
of presuppositional items is universal:
(31) Which of his three wives has John stopped beating?
Inference: John was beating all of his three wives
(32) Which of your three friends went to Paris again?
Inference: all three of your friends went to Paris before
(33) Which of these ten boys does Mary regret that Bill invited?
Inference: Mary believes that Bill invited each of these ten boys
Based on such examples I will assume that we should follow Heim (1992) in assuming
that presuppositions project out of questions in a universal fashion in general. (For a
recent discussion of presupposition projection from questions see also Guerzoni (2003),
who builds on Heim (2001).)
3.2. Contradictory presuppositions and complete answers
Can we connect the problem of incoherent presuppositions of questions to the
impossibility of having a complete answer? In this section I will suggest that the
generalization that complete answers are contradictory in the case of weak islands in fact
can be thought of as subsuming also the cases where the contradiction arises out of
incoherent presuppositions.
Recall that we have been operating with two distinct but related notions as
regarding the notion of answers: maximal answer and complete answer. A maximal
answer is the unique answer that is true and entails all the other true answers (Dayal
(1996), Jacobson (1995)). A complete answer is a strengthened version of a maximal
answer: it asserts that the alternatives that are not entailed are false. How do
presuppositions project out of a complete answer?
Let's take a look first at the following sentence:
(34) (Among John, Bill and Mary) Only John knows that his mother is a spy
a. 'John's mother is known to be a spy only by John'
b. 'John is the only one such that x's mother is known to be a spy by x'
The example in (34)b suggests that only patterns with generalized quantifiers in its
projection behavior: the sentence in (34) indeed seems to give rise to the inference that
everyone's mother is a spy.
(35) Inference of(34) : everyone's mother is a spy
I will assume therefore that quite generally presuppositions in the scope of only project in
a universal fashion:
(36) Only (Alt) (p) =Xw: p(w)=1. Vp'E Alt [pgap'-) p'(w)=O]
(37) Only (Alt) (ppres)(w)
Projected Presupposition: Vqe Alt: pres(w)=
Given that the exhaustive operator that we have been assuming is for all intents and
purposes equivalent to only (modulo the fact that it asserts, rather than presupposes the
truth of the prejacent), it is reasonable to assume that it will behave in a similar fashion to
only with respect to presupposition projection (38). Indeed, this prediction seems to be
confirmed by our intuition about a sentence such as the one in (31):
(38) Exh (Q) (ppr) (w)
Presupposition: Vqe Alt: pr(w)=1
A complete answer to a question including a presuppositional item will therefore come
with a set of presuppositions: the presuppositions of all the propositional alternatives.
3.3 A set of contradictory presuppositions
However, as I will show this set of presuppositions turns out to be contradictory in the
case of manner and degree questions. A set of contradictory presuppositions has the
unpleasant consequence that the sentence is unassertable in any context: this is because
there is no context in which all the presuppositions can be satisfied. Why will this set be
contradictory? The problem is that there will always be (at least) two alternatives that are
mutually incompatible, and yet will both have to be part of the set of presuppositions of a
complete answer. But since no context can entail two mutually exclusive propositions,
there will never be a context in which an answer to manner or degree questions
containing the above mentioned presuppositional items can be asserted. In the case of
questions about individuals however the (atomic) alternatives are independent from each
other and hence no problem will arise.
4 Contradiction and grammaticality
I have proposed above that the reason for the ungrammaticality of weak islands should
follow from the fact that all of their possible complete answers express a contradiction.
But why exactly does this fact lead to ungrammaticality? We are, after all, perfectly
capable of expressing contradictions that are not ungrammatical, cf. the example below:
(39) The table is red and not red.
What is the difference between the two types of contradiction and why does one, but not
the other lead to ungrammaticality? This section addresses this concern.
The earliest examples of analyses that that resort to analyticity were proposed by
Dowty (1979) and Barwise and Cooper (1981). Dowty (1979) argued that combining
accomplishment verbs with durative adverbials leads to a contradiction and that this
contradiction is the source of unacceptability, while Barwise and Cooper (1981) proposed
that an explanation of the ungrammaticality of strong quantifiers in existential there-
constructions follows from the fact that these would express a tautology. Later examples
of such reasoning include Chierchia (1984), von Fintel (1993)'s analysis of the
ungrammaticality of exceptives with non-universal quantifiers and Fox and Hackl (2005).
(cf. also Ladusaw (1986) and Gajewski (2002) for an overview). How can these
proposals be reconciled with the fact that natural language is capable to express
tautologies and contradictions, otherwise?
Gajewski (2002) argues that we need to distinguish between analyticity that
results from the logical constants alone, from analyticity that is the result of the non-
logical vocabulary. He argues that it is the former that plays an important role for natural
language: he argues that sentences that express a contradiction or tautology by virtue of
their logical constants are ungrammatical. He follows van Benthem (1989) and others in
defining logical constants as those notions that are permutation invariant.4 Thus linguistic
representations that have the same semantic value under any permutation of the domain
are ungrammatical. More precisely Gajewski (2002) proposes to distinguish two types of
analytic sentences: (ordinary) analytic sentences and L(ogical)-analytic sentences. While
(ordinary) analytic sentences are true in every model, L-analytic sentences are true in
every model with every possible combination of non-logical arguments. In other words,
L-analytic sentences are not only true in every model, but remain true under rewriting of
their non-logical parts. Gajewski (2002) further proposes that the kind of analycity that
induces ungrammaticality in natural language is L-analyticity.
(40) DEFINITION. An LF constituent a of type t is L-analytic iff a's logical skeleton
receives the denotation 1 (or 0) under every variable assignment.
4 This way of defining what counts as a logical constant and what is part of the non-logical vocabulary
might turn out to be too ambitious: e.g. predicates such as (self-)identical might turn out to be part of the
non-logical vocabulary, while being permutation invariant at the same time. It is possible therefore that we
(41) A sentence is ungrammatical if its Logical Form contains an L-analytic
constituent
Gajewski (2002) shows that (41) can correctly distinguish sentences like (39) from well-
known examples of ungrammatical analytic sentences, such as tautologies proposed in
Barwise and Cooper (1981)'s explanation of the ungrammaticality of strong quantifiers in
existential there-constructions and contradictions in von Fintel (1993)'s analysis of the
ungrammaticality of exceptives with non-universal quantifiers.
I will adopt Gajewski (2002)'s proposal that it is L-analyticity that leads to
ungrammaticality. What will have to be shown then is that complete answers to weak
islands are L-analytical. In other words, what we are looking for is to show that a
complete answer to weak islands remain ungrammatical under any variable assignment.
As we will see, this is indeed the case.
5 Extractees and interveners
5.1 The facts
Let's include here a list of the extractees that are sensitive to weak islands, as well as a
list of contexts that constitute weak islands for easier future reference. (cf. Szabolcsi
(2006) e.g. for a more detailed overview):
o Extractees that are sensitive to weak islands
The main examples of extractees that are sensitive to weak island contexts are the
following:
Questions about manners
(42) *How did John regret that he behaved at the party?
should be content with a less ambitious proposal, in which logical constants are simply stipulated as being
such, as in any logical system. (thanks to D. Fox for pointing this issue out to me)
Questions about degrees
(43) *How many children doesn't John have?
Questions involving when, where--in some cases
(44) a. *Where aren't you now?
b. Where haven't you looked for the keys?
Questions about individuals with one-time only predicates
(45) *Who has't destroyed Rome?
Split constructions
(46) *Combien as-tu beaucoup/souvent/peu/rarement consult6 de livres? [French]
how many have you a lot/often/a little/ rarely consulted of books
'How many books have you consulted a lot/often/a little/ rarely ?
(47) *Wat heb je veel/twee keer voor boeken gelesen? [Dutch]
what have you a lot/twice for books read?
'What kind of books have you read a lot/twice?'
examples (46)-(47) from de Swart (1992)
o Contexts that create weak islands
i. Negative Islands
(48) a. Who did Bill not invite to the party?
b. *How many children doesn't John have?
ii. Presuppositional Islands
Factive verbs:
(49) a. Who did John regret that he invited to the party?
b. *How did John regret that he behaved at the party?
Response stance verbs
(50) a. Who did John deny that he invited to the party?
b. *How much wine has John denied that he spilled at the party?
Extrapositic
(51) a.
b.
Adverbs of
(52) a.
b.
Only NP:
(53) a.
b.
iii.
(54)
iv.
(55)
Wn:
Who was it scandalous that John invited to the party?
*How was it scandalous that John behaved at the party?
quantification:
Who did you invite a lot?
*How did you behave a lot?
Who did only John invite to the party?
??How did only John behave at the party?
Weak Islands created by certain quantifiers
a. Who did few girls invite to the party?
b. ???How did few/less than 3 girls behave at the party?
c. How did at most 3 girls behave at the party?
Weak
a.
b.
c.
Islands created by (tenseless) Wh-Islands
Which man are you wondering whether to invite _?
*How are you wondering whether to behave_?
*How many books are they wondering whether to write next year_?
5.2 The proposal in a nutshell
In the next chapters of this dissertation I will show that the domain of weak island
inducers is special in that it leads to the following problems:
i. In the case of Negative islands, Quantificational interveners, Tenseless whether-
islands: the statement for any proposition that it is the complete answer is a
contradiction.
ii. In the case of presuppositional islands: the set of presuppositions that the question
stands with always contains at least two mutually incompatible propositions.
5.3 Preview of the following chapters
Chapter 2 contains an overview of the previous literature on this subject. Chapter 3
examines negative islands. I first discuss negative islands with manners, and propose that
the reason why a complete answer is not possible in these cases is that the domain of
manners always contains contraries. Second, I look at negative islands created by degree
constructions, and argue that these facts can be captured by an interval-based approach to
the semantics of degree constructions. After that, I will briefly look at other island-
sensitive extractees such as when and where and show that a similar approach to the one
presented for manner and degree questions can be extended to them as well. Building on
the results of the chapter on negative islands, Chapter 4 examines islands created by
presuppositional items in detail. I propose that an approach based on contrary manners/an
interval semantics of degrees can be extended in a straightforward fashion to explain the
oddness of these as well. Finally in Chapter 5 I look at islands created by quantificational
interveners, as well as islands created by tenseless whether-islands.
Chapter 2
Previous proposals
1. Introduction
This chapter is tribute to the predecessors, as well as an explanation as for why the search
for new explanations is still necessary. In my brief review of the previous proposals, I
will depart slightly from chronological order and group the various proposals according
to the similarity in the content of their proposals. It should be also borne in mind that the
different proposals often focus on a somewhat different range of facts. The discussion
here will be rather succinct, for a more detailed overview of most of the accounts
discussed below cf. Szabolcsi (2006) and den Dikken and Szabolcsi (2002).
2. Syntactic proposals: Rizzi (1990), Cinque (1990)
The basic idea behind all syntactic accounts of weak islands is the following: the contexts
that create weak islands are roadblocks for movement. However, items that possess a
special permit might still be able to go through. The points in (1) to (3) spell out how
Rizzi (1990) implements this idea. The main insight in Rizzi (1990) (which builds on
Obenauer (1984)) however is not so much the technical implementation of the above
idea, rather, an understanding of what constitutes roadblocks: roadblocks are items that
are sufficiently similar to the moved item. This is in fact the central idea of 'Relativised
minimality'.
(1) i. Referential A-bar phrases have indices (where "referential" is to be
understood as having a "referential" theta-role)
ii. Non-referential A-bar phrases do not have indices
(2) i. Binding requires identity of referential indices
ii. Referential A-bar, but not non-referential A-bar phrases can be connected
to their trace by binding
(3) i. Non-referential A-bar phrases need to be connected to their traces by
antecedent governed chain.
ii. An antecedent-chain is broken by intervening A-bar specifiers, or if the
clause from which the non-referential A-bar phrase is extracted is not
properly head governed by a verbal head
In other words, an antecedent chain is highly sensitive to intervention. However,
referential A-bar phrases have a special property (the index) which allows them to resort
to binding, instead of antecedent-government, to connect to their trace. Binding is an
arbitrarily long-distance relation that is not subject to interveners, therefore referential A-
bar phrases will not be subject to the same locality conditions as the non-referential A-bar
phrases. The idea of "Relativised Minimality" is manifested above by the fact that A-bar
specifiers are interveners for the movement of the like A-bar phrases. Let's look at an
example:
(4) *How are you wondering whether to behave?
(5) ?Which man are you wondering whether to invite?
The reason why (4) is unacceptable in Rizzi (1990)'s system is that the wh-adverb (an A-
bar phrase) needs to be connected to it's trace via an antecedent government chain.
However the complementiser whether is in an A-bar position (the spec of CP) therefore it
will intervene for the movement of another A-bar element. The wh-word in (5) however
is referential, and therefore it can connect to its trace via binding.
Cinque (1990) (drawing on Comorovski (1989) and Kroch (1989)) adds to the
above theory that referential items need to be also D-linked in the sense of Pesetsky
(1987) to be able to connect to their trace via binding. He motivates this by the
observation that wh-phrases such as how many dollars or who-the-hell5 seem to be
sensitive to weak islands, despite the fact that they receive a referential theta-role
according to Rizzi (1990)'s theory:
(6) a. *How many dollars did you regret that I have spent?
b. *Who the hell are you wondering whether to invite?
The basic idea of Rizzi (1990) and Cinque (1990) have been implemented since then in
various different forms, most importantly in the form of the Minimal Link Condition of
Chomsky (1995) and its revision in Manzini (1998); and in a feature-based format in
Starke (2001)'s theory of locality.
The main problems for these syntactic accounts that have been pointed out in the
literature (most importantly Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), Honcoop (1998), Rullmann
(1995), Szabolcsi (2006)) are the following:
i. It is unclear why certain quantifiers, but not others should occupy an A-bar
position.
ii. It is not clear that there is a syntactic difference between factive and response
stance verbs on the one hand, and other attitude verbs on the other hand.
5 D-linking will not pay a role in this thesis. As for wh-the hell expressions, I will (partly) follow Szabolcsi
and Zwarts (1993) who point out that D-linking does not seem to be the minimal difference between wh-
the-hell expressions and their plain counterpart. As for a felicitous use of an wh-the-hell expression, they
cite the following example (attributed to Bruce Hayes): " If we know that whenever someone sees his
mother, God sends purple rain, then upon seeing purple rain, I can ask: Who the hell saw his mother?"
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) argue that the example shows that the use of wh-the-hell expression requires
unquestionable evidence that someone saw his mother. I believe, however, that what the example shows is
rather the property of wh-the-hell expressions noted in den Dikken and Giannakidou (2002) that they
induce obligatory domain-widening. In the example above, the salient domain of individuals is everyone in
the world. Once we have such a wide domain in mind, some of the weak-island examples improve as well:
e.g. if we change the above scenario a bit, such that God sends purple rain whenever someone does not call
his mother on her birthday, then, upon seeing purple rain, the following negative question becomes
perfectly acceptable: Who-the-hell didn't call his mother? As for how-many phrases, I will follow
Rullmann (1995) who argues that the difference in the acceptability of such examples is that of scope,
rather than D-linking.
iii. Negation can be cross-linguistically expressed as a head or a specifier or an
adjunct, yet the island-creating behavior of negation does not vary cross-
linguistically.
iv. The theory claims to be syntactic, yet the characterization of the good vs. bad
extractees seems to be semantic in nature. This calls for further explanation.
To the above list of well-known complaints we might add the following problem, which
in fact is probably the most troubling:
v. Fox and Hackl (2005) have argued that certain quantifiers can rescue negative
islands: more precisely, universal modals above negation or existential modals
under negation save negative degree questions:
(7) a. How much radiation are we not allowed to expose our workers to?
b. How much are you sure that this vessel won't weigh?
It is highly unlikely that a syntactic account could be extended to explain these
facts: if negation is an A-bar intervener, the addition of a modal should not be
able to change this fact.
3. General Semantic Accounts: Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), and its
extensions in Honcoop (1998)
The very first paper to propose that the weak island intervention facts should follow from
semantic properties was Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1990). This first theory was then
substantially revised in Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993). The revisions were mainly
motivated by a paper by de Swart that has appeared in the meantime (de Swart (1992)).
The important contribution of de Swart (1992) was that it challenged the prevailing view
that it is only DE operators that create intervention. She argued, based on split
constructions, that in fact all scopal elements cause intervention. The real difference
between DE and UE quantifiers is that for independent reasons, a wide scope (pair-list)
reading is not available for DE quantifiers in questions (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1984)). Thus, while the question below is grammatical, importantly it does not have the
reading in (25)b:
(8) How many pounds does every boy weigh?
(a) 'For every boy x, how many pounds does x weigh?'
(b) '#For what n, every boy weighs at least n?'
(c) 'What is the unique degree such that every boy weighs (exactly) that much?'
Downward entailing quantifiers on the other hand do not have the possibility for the wide
scope (pair-list) reading, therefore they appear ungrammatical. Szabolcsi and Zwarts
(1993) point out however that the proposal in de Swart (1992) according to which scopal
items thus always create intervention seems to be too strong: they argue that e.g.
indefinites and (non-factive) attitude verbs do not seem to cause intervention6:
(9) ?How did a boy behave?
(10) How do you want me to behave?
3.1 An algebraic semantic account: Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) attempt therefore at drawing a principled demarcation line
between the scopal expressions that create intervention, and those that do not. Their
explanation, based on algebraic semantics, proceeeds in the following steps, as
summarized in (11) to(13)7. The first step in their proposal is the following:
(11) Each scopal element is associated with certain Boolean operations.
This claim should be understood that each scopal element in conjunction with a
distributive verbal predicate can be interpreted as a Boolean combination of singular
predications (assuming that the domain of students is given):
6 As regards indefinites however the facts are not that clear: cf. discussion in Honcoop (1998) and in
Chapter 5 of this thesis.
7 This presentation draws also on Honcoop (1998)'s explication of Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)'s theory,
which is more explicit than the authors themselves.
John walked
John did not walk
No student walked
Less than two students walked
v. Every student walked
vi. A student walked
vi. A student walked
=W(j)
=-(w(j))
=-(W(j)vW(b)vW(m))
((W(j)AW(b))v(W(j)AW(m))V(W(m)AW(b))
=W(j)AW(b)AW(m)
=W(j)vW(b)vW(m)
These observations can be generalized in the following way:
i.
11ii.
111.
iii.iv.
Negation corresponds to taking Boolean complement
Universal quantification corresponds to taking Boolean meet
Existential quantification corresponds to taking Boolean join
Numerical quantification corresponds to a combination of at least Boolean
meet and join (and, in the case of DE operators, complement)
The second step in the proposal can be stated as follows:
(12) For a wh-phrase to take scope over a scopal element means that the operations
associated with the scopal element need to be performed in the wh-phrase's
denotation domain.
This means the following. To answer the question in (i) below, we need to construct the
set of people that John likes: (the set of individuals is indicated by :=; L stands for likes')
i. Who does John like? :={ a: (j,a)e I[L }
To answer the question in (ii) below, we need to construct the set of people that John
likes, and then take its complement (where D stands for the domain of discourse):
ii. Who doesn't John like?
To answer the question in (iii) on the non-pair list reading, we construct for each student
s the set of people liked by s, and then intersect these sets:
iii. Who does every student like?
=n { { a: (j,a)e [Lj }, { a: (b,a)e L }, { a: (m,a)e L } }
And so on. The last piece of the explanation is the following:
(13) If the wh-phrase denotes in a domain for which the requisite operation is not
defined, it cannot scope over SE.
In the examples above, the wh-ranges over individuals. Individuals can be collected to
unordered sets. All Boolean operations can be performed on sets of individuals, because
the power set of any set of individuals forms a Boolean algebra. However, if the wh-
phrase ranged over a partially ordered domain that was not closed under some Boolean
operation, the scopal item corresponding to this Boolean operation should block the wh-
phrase from scoping over the scopal element. Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) claim that
manners range over a partially ordered domain (a free join-semilattice), where
components of each (plural) manner do not form a set but a sum. Amounts form a join
semilattice, while numbers form a chain (a special lattice). Complementation and/or meet
cannot be performed on these structures, therefore the wh-elements that denote in these
partially ordered domains will not be able to scope over the scopal elements that
correspond to these operations. As e.g. universal quantification corresponds to meet, but
existential quantification corresponds to join, universal but not existential quantifiers are
predicted to be interveners. The bad extractees then are those which range over a domain
that has a partial ordering defined on it, while the good extractees range over a domain of
individuals.
:=D \ { a: (j,a)e ýL }
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)'s account is based on the very interesting idea that
the difference between the good and the bad extractees is to be found in the properties of
their domain. This idea, albeit in a completely different form, is also shared by the
account that is developed in this thesis, as well as by Fox and Hackl (2005), in yet
another way. However, the account in Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) faces certain serious
problems:
i. As the authors themselves point out, their account is rather programmatic as far as
presuppositional interveners and tenseless whether-islands are concerned: they do
not offer any real account.
ii. It is unclear why individuals, but not manners can be collected into sets. To
formulate the problem in a different way, they do not offer any strong arguments
for the assumption that manners denote in a domain that is a free join semilattice,
and therefore do not have a 0 element, while the domain of individuals has the
zero element and therefore denotes a Boolean algebra (cf. e.g. Landman (1989)
for arguments that individuals should denote a free join semilattice, instead of a
Boolean algebra)
iii. Finally, similarly to the syntactic accounts, Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)'s theory
does not seem to be able to explain the modal obviation effects discovered by Fox
and Hackl (2005) (cf. (4) above.) It is rather implausible that adding a modal
should be able to turn the partially ordered domain of manners or degrees into
sets, such that now the required algebraic operation could be performed.
Interestingly, modal obviation is not restricted to negative islands, other
quantificational interveners seem to be sensitive to it as well. In particular, the
missing reading of example (25) can be recovered by adding a modal (this fact
was pointed out to me by B. Spector, pc.)8 :
(14) How many pounds are you sure that every boy weighs?
8 A similar fact was also pointed out in Rullmann (1995), however he does not realize the significance of
the example, he simply takes it as an argument against de Swart (1992)'s observation.
The modal obviation facts therefore seem to constitute a very serious problem for
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)'s account as well.
3.2 What for split and Dynamic Semantics: Honcoop (1998)
Honcoop (1998) formulates a dynamic semantic account for what-for split constructions
in Germanic languages, which are usually taken to be sensitive to weak islands. His
account is based on two very interesting observations. The first observation is that the
interveners that make the what-for split impossible coincide with the class of expressions
that create inaccesible domains for dynamic anaphora. This claim is based on the
following facts:
(15) *{no student/exactly 3 students/ more than 3 students/ I wonder whether John }
bought a book. It was expensive.
Such elements, he claims are the same as the ones that cause intervention in the case of
the what-for split.
(16) Honcoop (1998)'s generalization
The class of expressions that induce weak islands coincides with the class of
expressions that create inaccessible domains for dynamic anaphora.
Honcoop (1998)'s second interesting observation is that interveners for negative polarity
licensing (as discussed originally by Linebarger (1981)) seem to be exactly the same
class as the weak island interveners.
Honcoop accepts Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)'s explanation for weak islands in
general, but he goes on to argue that neither the what-for split constructions nor the NPI
intervention facts could be handled in terms of algebraic semantics. Instead, he argues,
these cases should be handled in terms of dynamic semantics. In the version of dynamic
semantics he assumes (Dekker (1993)), dynamic binding is made possible by the
operation of existential disclosure. However, existential disclosure cannot be performed
across negation and other elements that create inaccessible domains. Now the fact that the
what-for split is sensitive to negation should be understood as follows. First, observe the
ungrammatical example of a what-for split in (17)b:
(17) a. Watj heeeft Jan voor een manj gezien?
What has Jan for a man seen?
'What kind of man did Jan see?'
b. *Watj heeeft Jan niet voor een manj gezien?
What has Jan not for a man seen?
'What kind of man didn't Jan see?'
The indefinite een man is construed as a property restricting the range of the variable
quantified over by wat. To get this, we need to apply existential disclosure to it in order
to be able to dissolve the existential quantifier by means of which een man is interpreted.
In other words, the property reading of een man is derived by existential disclosure.
However, existential disclosure cannot apply if negation interveners, and for this reason
the property reading of een man cannot be derived. However, now the question cannot be
interpreted any more.
Honcoop (1998)'s account offers some very creative observations. However, the
basic notion, that what-for split is completely analogous to other weak islands do seem to
raise some questions:
i. While the class of interveners for the what-for split seems very similar to that of
weak islands, it seems that the what-for split is more sensitive: quantifiers that are
usually not taken to cause weak island effect (e.g. at most 3, exactly 3) seem to be
strong interveners in the case of the what-for split 9.
ii. Another discrepancy between the what-for split and ordinary weak islands is that
in the case of the former, modal obviation does not seem to happen. The examples
below illustrate the case of German. (However, note that interestingly, the French
combien-split does improve, cf. the discussion in Spector (2005)).
9 This in fact, seems also be true of the French combien-split.
(18) a. *Was hat Jan nicht ffir ein Buch gelesen? [German]
b. *Was hat Jan ftir ein Buch nicht gelesen?
"what kind of book has Jan not read?"
(19) a. *Was darf Jan nicht ffir ein Buch lesen?
b. *Was darf Jan fur ein Buch nicht lesen?
c. Was fUr ein Buch darf Jan nicht lesen?
"what kind of book is Jan not allowed to read?"
(20) a. *Was ist Jan sicher fUr ein Buch nicht lesen zu wollen?
b. *Was ist Jan ftir ein Buch sicher nicht lesen zu wollen?
c. Was ffir ein Buch ist Jan sicher nicht lesen zu wollen?
"What kind of book is Jan sure not to (want to) read?"
(judgements courtesy of Michael Wagner, pc.)
4 Negative degree islands: Rullmann (1995) and Fox and Hackl
(2005)
In this section I turn to proposals that were proposed specifically to account for negative
(and DE) degree islands. It is standardly assumed that a sentence such as (21) has the
meaning that John has at least 3 children:
(21) John has 3 children = The degree d such that John has d children 2 3
Given this assumption, the propositions in the Hamblin denotation of a question such as
the one below in will be strictly ordered by entailment, as shown in Figure 1. (The arrow
indicates the direction of entailment.)
(22) How many children does John have?
Figure 1: Hamblin denotation of (22)
John has 1 child
John has 2 children
John has 3 children
John has 4 children
John has 5 children
00oo
If the fact of the matter in the actual world is that John has exactly 3 children, there will
be 3 propositions in the Hamblin set that are true. Yet we need to account for the intuition
that the question is asking for a "maximal answer" in some sense. Rullmann (1995) and
Fox and Hackl (2005) have observed that this requirement of degree questions might be
also employed to account for the negative island effect in degree questions. This section
briefly reviews these proposals.
4.1 Rullmann (1995)
Building on work by von Stechow (1984), Rullmann (1995) proposed that degree
questions ask for the largest degree that satisfies a certain property. In other words he
proposes that degree questions have he following meaning:
(23) How many t? = What is the maximal degree d such that p(d)?
For example a positive degree question is understood as follows:
(24) How many children does John have?
What is the maximal degree d such that John has (at least) d children?
However when we try to interpret a negative question, we run into trouble:
(25) *How many children doesn't John have?
What is the maximal degree d such that John does not have (at least) d children?
The problem is that if e.g. John has exactly 3 children, than any degree above 3 is such
that John does not have that many children. However, since degrees in this case are not
contextually restricted, there is no maximal degree d, such that John does not have that
many children. For this reason, the negative degree question in (25) is unacceptable. The
figure below illustrates Rullmann (1995)'s reasoning, and at the same time foreshadows
the reasoning in Fox and Hackl (2005).
Figure 2 :: Scenario: : John has 3 children
POSITIVE QUESTION NEGATIVE QUESTION
John has 1 child Rullmann (1995) John doesn't have 1 child
John has 2 children Fox and Hackl(2005) John doesn't have 2 children
John has 3 childreni* John doesn't have 3 children
John has 4 children John doesn't have 4 children
John has 5 children John doesn't have 5 children
Rullmann (1995) ... Fox and Hackl (2005)
4.2. Fox and Hackl (2005)
Beck and Rullmann (1999) have proposed a theory of questions partly similar to Dayal
(1996) and Jacobson (1995)'s, according to which questions ask for the most informative
answer. As they themselves note, this proposal has an adverse side-effect: the original
account of Rullmann (1995) cannot be maintained. The reason is as follows. To
synchronize Rullmann (1995) with Beck and Rullmann (1999), Fox and Hackl (2005)
suggest that the meaning of meaning of degree questions now should look as follows:
(26) How many qp? = What is the degree d that yields the most informative among the
true propositions of the form qp(d)?
Given this new reasoning, in the scenario that was illustrated in Figure 1 the answer John
does not have 4 children should count as the most informative true answer: this is
because the proposition that John does not have 4 children entails the proposition that
John does not have 5 children and so on. However, now it seems that the explanation as
to why a negative degree question should be unacceptable is lost.
To remedy this situation, Fox and Hackl (2005) propose that the following
hypothesis about degree scales should be assumed:
(27) Measurement Scales that are needed for natural language semantics are always
dense (The Universal Density of Measurement [UMD])
They argue that given the assumption that the set of degrees is now dense, there is no
minimal degree that gives a maximally informative true proposition. Let's see why: Let's
say it is a fact about the world that there is a cardinal number of children that John has. In
other words we might say that the number of children that John has corresponds to a
(right)-closed interval and the degree 3 is the endpoint (the closure) of this interval: (0,3].
But given the density assumption the complement of this interval will be a (left)-open
interval that excludes the degree 3: (3,m) 10. The negative question asks for the most
informative answer among the propositions about the degrees in this left-open interval.
Given the downward entailing pattern the most informative answer will be the smallest n
such that John does not have that many children: in our pictures the leftmost degree.
However, there is no leftmost degree, as the interval is left-open. The problem then is that
questions ask for the most informative answer, but among the true answers to a negative
degree question there never is a maximally informative element. These questions
therefore cannot have a maximal answer and are ungrammatical. (In the drawings below,
O represents that an interval is open, while * represents that the interval is closed)
(28) *How many children doesn't John have?
What is the most informative proposition among the propositions of the form John
does not have d children?
(29) Has[0,3] -has (3, oo)
(right)-closed (left)-open
As noted above, Fox and Hackl (2005) make the very important observation that
universal modals above negation, or alternatively existential modals below negation, have
the capacity to save negative degree questions:
(30) If you live in China, how many children are you not allowed to have?
(31) How much radiation are we not allowed to expose our workers to?
(32) How much are you sure that this vessel won't weigh?
Their proposal can handle these facts. This is, they argue, because now, the set of true
(negative) answers might correspond to a closed interval: For example the regulations
might require that we do not expose our workers to a 100 millisievert/year or more. In
this case the interval which corresponds to the amount that we are not allowed to expose
our workers is a left-closed interval [100, o,), while the interval that corresponds to the
amount that we are allowed to expose our workers to is a right-open interval [0,100).
Given that in a downward entailing context the propositions about the degrees "to the
left" will entail the propositions about the degrees "to the right" of them, a left-closed
interval will have a maximal element.
(33) Allowed [0,100) not allowed [100, oo)
right-open left-closed
Fox and Hackl (2005) also show that their account predicts that existential modals above
negation should not be able to save negative islands violations.
10 (a,b)= { xeRI a<x<b} ; (a,oo)={xc RI a<x} ; [a,b]={xe RI a5x_<b ; [a,b)= {xl R a:x<b} etc.
The account in Fox and Hackl (2005) makes the extremely important observation
about modal obviation, and proposes a witty account to explain this pattern. Yet, we
might ask some questions about the system that Fox and Hackl (2005) develop:
i. Can it be extended to weak island extractees other than degrees?
ii. Can it be extended to weak island creating interveners other than negation?
The first question is in fact addressed in Fox (2007). He proposes that although UDM
itself cannot be responsible for other types of extraction than questions about degrees, a
broader generalization about non-exhaustifiable sets of alternatives can subsume both the
cases that can be accounted for by the UDM, and other examples of non-exhaustifiability.
(34) Fox (2007)'s generalization
Let p be a proposition and A a set of propositions. p is non-exhaustifiable
given A: [NE (p)(A)] if the denial of all alternatives in A that are not entailed by
p is inconsistent with p.
Further, he conjectures, that any account for negative manner questions should then fall
under the generalization in (34) above.
The se:cond question seems more problematic for Fox and Hackl (2005), as it is
not clear that an account based on the UDM is extendable to other islands, e.g.
presuppositional islands and tenseless whether-islands. For example, observe a
presuppositional island such as the one below:
(35) *How many apples do you regret that John ate?
Suppose, as it was argued in Chapter 1, that the presupposition of regret projects out of
the question in a universal fashion. The question then should come with the
presupposition that John ate every apple in the domain. This might be implausible, but
Fox and Hackl (2005)'s system is blind to this fact: as long as there is a maximal answer,
i.e. we do not derive a formal contradiction, the question should be acceptable. However,
it is not. It seems then that there are good reasons therefore to keep on looking for an
account that can be extended to these other cases of islands as well.
In what follows, I will propose an account that adopts the insight of Fox and
Hackl (2005) that negative island violations result from a maximization failure. However,
the approach that will be developed in the next chapters differs from their account in
crucial respects:
i. I will propose an interval-based account for negative degree questions that does
not rely on the UDM. Rather, it will exemplify what might be called the
symmetry generalization: Let p be a proposition and A a set of propositions: For
any p, there are at least 2 alternatives in A such that each of them can be denied
consistently with p, but the denial of both of these alternatives is inconsistent with
p.
ii. The reasoning in terms of symmetric alternatives can itself cover the cases of
manner islands as well.
iii. Further, the account can also explain the cases of presuppositional islands and
whether islands, and make interesting predictions about certain cases of quantifier
intervention.
Finally, I will also observe that while the symmetry generalization falls under Fox
(2007)'s generalization, it is more restrictive than that, and makes different predictions
about weak islands other than negation.
Chapter 3
Negative Islands*
1. Introduction
This chapter proposes an explanation for the oddness of negative islands, such as (1) and
(2). These examples are in contrast with that in (3), which shows that individuals can
escape negation without any problems.
(1) *How didn't John behave at the party?
(2) *How many children doesn't John have?
(3) Who didn't John invite to the party?
I will argue that the reason for the unacceptability of (1) and (2) is that they cannot have
a maximally informative true answer. As a consequence, any complete answer to them
will amount to the statement of a contradiction. The reason for this will be that for any
proposition p in the question domain, there will be at least two alternatives to p that
cannot be denied at the same time.
In the case of manner questions the intuitive idea is very simple: the domain of
manners contains contrary predicates, such as fast, slow, medium speed, etc. However, as
the domain of manners is structured in such a way that the predicates themselves are in
opposition with each other, in some contexts it might turn out to be impossible to select
* I would like to express here my intellectual debt to Benjamin Spector, whose suggestion to use an interval
semantics for degree constructions has improved the analysis that I eventually propose for the negative
degree questions in this chapter greatly. Cf. Section 3 and in particular Section 3.2. for details.
any proposition in the denotation of manner questions as the most informative true
proposition. In the case of negative degree questions I will argue that maximization
failure is predicted if we assume an interval-based semantics of degree constructions.
Given then that there can be no most informative true answer to such questions, any
potential complete answer to such questions will amount to the statement of a
contradiction.
An account for negative islands however not only has to apply for the odd
examples above: it is also necessary to explain why in some cases the above examples
can be rescued. There are two such cases in the literature: the cases of modal obviation
observed by Fox and Hackl (2005), and the cases made famous by Kroch (1989), which
show that providing an explicit list of options to choose from can improve the questions
above.
Modal obviation The important empirical observation that was made in Fox and
Hackl (2005) (partly building on work by Kuno and Takami (1997)) is that universal
modals above negation, or equivalently, existential modals under negation save negative
degree questions:
(4) How much radiation are we not allowed to expose our workers to?
(5) How much are you sure that this vessel won't weigh?
This pattern was noted for negative degree questions, but in fact it seems to be entirely
general across all negative islands11: (6) provides an example of a negative question
about manners.
(6) How is John not allowed to behave at the party?
Kroch-examples It is well known since Kroch (1989) that examples like (1) improve
greatly if the context specifies a list of options (cf. (7))
11 Except islands created by why, as noted by Fox (2007). However, islands created by why have a number
of properties that make them distinct from other weak-island sensitive extractees, as noted in Szabolcsi and
Zwarts (1993), Ko (2005) and Fox (2007), among others.
(7) How didn't John behave at the party: wisely or impolitely?
Explicit lists seem to improve negative degree questions to a great extent as well. This is
exemplified in (8). However, notice that an answer "50" to be felicitous seems to require
a context such that there be separate events of scoring 20, 30 and 40 respectively.
(8) Among the following, how many points did Iverson not score?
A. 20 B.30 C.40 D.50
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the proposal for
negative manner questions while Section 3 addresses negative degree questions. In
Section 4 I will discuss some other instances of unacceptable negative questions such as
questions with adjectives, as well as temporal and spacial modifiers in certain
environments cf. (9)-(11).
(9) *What isn't John like?
(10) *When didn't Jesus resurrect?
(11) *Where aren't you at the moment?
I will argue that these sentences can receive an explanation in a similar spirit as the
examples with the manner and degree question. Finally in Section 5 I will discuss certain
more general aspects of the present proposal and compare them to the generalization
proposed in Fox (2007).
2. Negative islands created by manner adverbials
2.1 About manner predicates
2.1.1 Pluralities of manners
I will assume that manner predicates denote a function from events (e) to truth-values (t),
or equivalently a set of events:
(12) Ifast]={e Ifast e}
Extending Landman (1989)'s version of Link (1983) to manner predicates, I will assume
that we form plural manners as illustrated below:
(13) Ifast+carelessly]= { {e I fast e} ,{e I careless e} }
Given this way of forming plural manner predicates, we arrive at a structured domain, not
unlike that of the domain of individuals that we have seen in the previous section. Given
our assumptions based on Landman (1989), neither the domain of individuals nor the
domain of manners will have a zero element-but this is a matter of convenience and
naturalness, rather than an essential ingredient of our proposal. This is in contrast with
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)'s proposal, even though they too argue that the domain of
manners should be thought of as a free join semilattice. However, crucially for them, the
domain of individuals forms a Boolean algebra and thus has a zero element, but not the
domain of manners. Here in contrast we do not need to adhere to this stipulation: the
domain of manners as well as that of individuals might (as in Link (1983)) or might not
(as in Landman (1989)) have a zero element-this issue is immaterial for the account to
be developed below. For reasons of simplicity, I will assume that it does not contain a
zero element.
Let's pause for a second and think about how a plural manner such as the one in
(13) will be able to combine with a predicate of events. Since in this case we have sets of
sets of events, predicate modification will not be able to apply in a simple fashion.
Furthermore, if we look at an example such as the one below, we also want our semantics
to predict that the running event in question was both fast and careless.
(14) a. John ran fast and carelessly
b. Xw. 3e [run(w)(e)(John) A fast+carelessly (w)(e)]
To resolve this type conflict and to derive the appropriate meaning, we will postulate an
operator D that applies to plural manner predicates, much in the fashion of the
distributive operator commonly assumed for individuals:
(15) D (PpL)=Xe. VPEPPL p(e)
Similarly to predication over plural individuals again, we might observe that talking
about plural manners gives rise to all-or-nothing effects in the unmarked case.12 However
the formula in (16)c only means that there is no event of running by John that was both
fast and careless.
(16) a. John didn't run fast and carelessly
b. 'John run neither fast nor carelessly'
c. Xw. -- 3e [run(w)(e)(John) A fast+carelessly (w)(e)]
Therefore, again inspired by the treatment of homogeneity reviewed in Chapter 113, we
will postulate a homogeneity presupposition on the D-operator introduced above:
(17) D (PPL)=e: [VPEPPL p(e)] or [VpEPPL --p(e)]. VpEPPL p(e).
Let's look at an example of a positive question about manners. The Hamblin-denotation
of the question will contain a set of propositions such as {that John's running was in
manner a, that John's running was in manner 13, etc}. Given our assumption that the
domain of manners contains both singular and plural manner predicates, the question
word how will range over both singular and plural manner predicates as well. Notice that
I will assume that a question such as (18) talks about a contextually given event, which I
12 However, in some contexts it might be possible to understand such examples as if and was Boolean. To
account for these cases we might say that and is in fact ambiguous between a Boolean and a plural-forming
and. However, this will not change the reasoning because in the case of negative sentences the alternative
that employs a Boolean and will not have a chance to be a maximally informative answer in any case.
[thanks to Danny Fox (pc) for pointing this out to me.]
13 The definition of the distributive operator for plural predicates over individuals was as follows:
(1) Dist (P)-=-x: [Vye x P(y)] or [Vye x -P(y)]. 'Vye x P(y)
will represent here by (e*). In other words the question in (18) is interpreted as 'How was
John's running?'.
(18) a. How did John run?
b. Xp. 3qmanner [run (w)(e*)(John) A qmanner (w)(e*)]
c. {that John ran fast, that John run fast+carelessly, etc.. }
Given the D operator introduced above, the proposition that John run fast+carelessly will
entail that John run fast and that John run carelessly. If this proposition is indeed the
maximal true answer, we will conclude that John's running was performed in a fast and
careless manner, and in no other manner in particular.
2.1.2 Contraries and the ban on forming incoherent plural manners
The crucial assumption that I would like to introduce is that the domain of manners
always contains contraries. The observation that predicates have contrary oppositions
dates back to Aristotle's study of the square of opposition and the nature of logical
relations. (cf. Horn (1989) for a historical survey and a comprehensive discussion of the
distinction btw. contrary and contradictory oppositions, as well as Gajewski (2005) for a
more recent discussion of the linguistic significance of contrariety). Contrariety is
relation that holds between two statements that cannot be simultaneously true, though
they may be simultaneously false. A special class of contraries are contradictories, which
not only cannot be simultaneously true, but they cannot be simultaneously false either.
Natural language negation is usually taken to yield contradictory statements (cf. e.g. Horn
(1989)).
(19) Two statements are contraries if they cannot be simultaneously true
(20) Two statements are contradictories if they cannot be simultaneously true or false
A classic example of a pair of contrary statements is a universal statement and its inner
negation (assuming that the universal quantifier comes with an existential presupposition)
such as (21). Other examples of contrary statements include pairs of contrary predicates
such as the sentences in (22) and (23), where it is impossible for a single individual to be
both short and tall, or to be both completely red or blue. Contrary negation is also often
manifested in English by the affixal negation un-, such as e.g. in the case of pairs of
predicates like wise and unwise (24):
(21) a. Every man is mortal
b. Every man is not mortal (=No man is mortal)
(22) a. John is short
b. John is tall
(23) a. The table is blue
b. The table is red
(24) a. John is wise
b. John is unwise
What distinguishes then contrary predicates from contradictory predicates is that two
contrary predicates may be simultaneously false: it is possible for a table to be neither red
nor blue, for an individual to be neither tall or short, or neither wise or unwise. This is
also shown by the fact that the negation of predicates is usually not synonymous with
their antonyms: the statement that John is not sad e.g. does not imply that he is happy.
Similarly to other predicates then, the domain of manners also contains contraries.
In fact I will claim that every manner predicate has at least one contrary in the domain of
manners (which is not a contradictory). Moreover, we will say that for any pair of a
predicate P and a contrary of it, P', there is a middle-predicate pM such that at least some
of the events that are neither in P or P' are in PM. (25) summarizes the conditions on the
domain of manners:
(25) Manners denote functions from events to truth values. The set of manners (DM) in
a context C is a subset of [{f I E-{1,0} }=g(E)] that satisfies the following
conditions:
i. for each predicate of manners PEDM, there is at least one contrary
predicate of manners P'EDM, such that P and P' do not overlap: PnP' =0.
ii. for each pair (P, P'), where P is a manner predicate and P'is a contrary of
P, and PCEDM and P'eDM , there is a set of events Pm EDM, such that for
every event e in PM EDM [eeP EDM & eEP'eDM ].
I will assume that context might implicitly restrict the domain of manners, just as the
domain of individuals, but for any member in the set {P, P', pM}, the other two members
are alternatives to it in any context. Some examples of such triplets are shown below:
(26) a. P: wisely; fast; by bus
b. P': unwisely; slowly; by car
c. PM: neither wisely nor unwisely; medium speed; neither by car or by bus
Given what we have said above it is somewhat surprising that the sentences below are
odd: if the conjunction of two predicates is interpreted as forming a plural manner, and
homogeneity applies, (27)a should mean that John ran neither fast nor slowly. Similarly,
(27)b should simply mean that John's reply was neither wise nor unwise. We have just
argued above that it is a property of contrary predicates that they might be simultaneously
false. So why should the sentences in (27) be odd?
(27) a. #John did not run fast and slowly
b. #John did not reply wisely and unwisely
I will say that it is the presupposition on forming plural manner predicates {pl,P2} that
plnp2O0. It is then for this reason that the sentences in (27) are unacceptable: e.g. the
plural manner { fast, slow } is a presupposition failure since it is not possible for a running
event to be both fast and slow at the same time, and therefore the plural manner cannot be
formed.
I would like to suggest that this condition might be connected to a more general
requirement that a plurality should be possible14. Spector (2007), who defends the view
14 The connection with Spector's work was brought to my attention by Giorgio Magri (pc).
according to which the extension of plural common nouns contains both singularities and
pluralities notes that the oddness of sentences like (28) is unexpected under this view:
(28) should simply mean that John doesn't have a father, and hence should be acceptable.
Spector (2007) claims that plural indefinites induce a modal presupposition according to
which the 'at least two' reading of a plural noun should at least be possible. In the case at
hand, the presupposition required that it should be at least possible to have more than one
father.
(28) #Jack doesn't have fathers.
It seems then that our presupposition that gives the restriction on forming incoherent
plural manners might be part of a more general requirement on forming pluralities. 15
To sum up, in this section we have introduced a couple of assumptions about
manner predicates that all seem to be motivated independently. Manner predicates have
contraries, plus there is a predicate that denotes a set of events that belong to neither p nor
its contrary. These three predicates are alternatives to each other in any context. The final
assumption was that it is impossible to form incoherent plural predicates, which seemed
to be again a general property of forming pluralities.
2.2 The proposal: Negative Islands with manner questions
We finally have everything in place to spell out the account of negative manner
questions. We will say that the reason for the ungrammaticality of questions like (1), in
contrast to (3) (repeated below as (29) and (30)) is that we cannot form a maximally
informative true answer to a negative question about manners.
(29) *How didn't John behave at the party?
(30) Who didn't John invite to the party?
15 Szabolcsi and Haddican (2004) also discuss examples where forming coherent pluralities seems to be an
issue.
Why? The reason is rooted in the fact that the domain of manners contains contraries.
Let's see how.
2.2.1 Positive and negative manner questions
Let's look first at positive questions about manners. As I have suggested above, in any
given context, the domain of manners might be restricted, but for any predicate of events
p, its contrary p' and the middle-predicate pM will be among the alternatives in the
Hamblin set. Suppose that the context restricts the domain of manners to the dimension
of wisdom. Now the alternatives in the Hamblin-denotation of (31) will contain at least
these (31)b:
(31) a: How did John behave?
b. {that John behaved wisely, that John behaved unwisely,
that John behaved neither wisely nor unwisely}
Suppose now that John indeed behaved wisely. Given that the three alternatives are
exclusive (as contraries cannot be simultaneously true), if the Hamblin set contains only
these three propositions, no other proposition will be true. In other words, the event in
question (e*) is an element of the set of events denoted by wisely, and not an element of
any other set. This is graphically represented below:
(32) e*
wise med-wise unwise
Since in this case this is the only true proposition, this will at the same time be the most
informative true answer as well. This is in parallel with what we have seen with questions
about singular individuals. Note that if we had more propositions in the Hamblin set, e.g.
wisely, politely, and their conratraries respectively, as well as the plural manners that can
be formed from these, the situation would be similar to questions that range over both
singular and plural individuals. Suppose that John in fact behaved wisely and politely:
given the distributive interpretation of plural predicates introduced above, this will entail
that he behaved wisely and that he behaved politely, and imply that he did not behave in
any other manner, i.e. he did not behave unwisely, impolitely, etc.
Let's look now at a negative question. First imagine, that our context restricts the
domain to the dimension of wiseness.
(33) a: *How didn't John behave?
b. p. 3qmannmer [behave (w)(e*)(John) A -- qmamer (w)(e*)]
c. {that John did not behave wisely, that John did not behave unwisely,
that John did not behave neither wisely nor unwisely
Let's imagine first, that John did not behave wisely was a complete answer. This would
mean that the only set of events among our alternatives which does not contain the event
in question (e*) is the set of wise events. But this means that the event in question is both
a member of the set of events denoted by unwisely, and the set of events denoted by
neither wisely not unwisely (in short: med-wisely). This situation is graphically
represented below:
(34) a. John did not behave wisely
b. e* e*
wisely med-wisely unwisely
-- this cannot be true because of ((25) ii)
Yet, this cannot be true, because these two sets are exclusive by definition, and no event
can be a member of both of them. Therefore (34) cannot be complete answer to (33).
What about an answer such as (35) below?
(35) a. #John did not behave wisely and unwisely
b. e*
wise med-wise unwise
This answer is ruled out by the presupposition that excludes the formation of incoherent
plural manners. The predicates wisely and unwisely are contraries, and therefore they
cannot form a plural manner. (As mentioned above, this is also the reason why the
sentence itself in (35) is odd.) Therefore, the maximum of the two true predicates, namely
that John did not behave wisely, and that john did not behave unwisely is not in the set of
alternatives. Therefore (35) cannot be the most informative true answer either. But now
we have run out of options, if neither (34) nor (35) can be a maximal answer, there is no
maximal answer. It is easy to see that if we had more alternatives, e.g. the alternatives
based on wiseness and politeness, (i.e. wisely, med-wisely, unwisely, politely, impolitely,
med-politely and the acceptable pluralities that can be formed based on these) the
situation would be similar: Any answer that contains only one member of each triplet
leads to contradiction, and any answer that contains more than one member of each triplet
is a presupposition failure. There is no way out, no maximal answer can be given.
It should be noted that given the similarity of selecting a complete answer to
definite descriptions, the above account predicts that definite descriptions such as (36)
should be also unacceptable:
(36) #the way in which John didn't behave.
This prediction is indeed borne out. The reason is of course that there is no maximum
among the various manners in which John did not behave.
2.2.2 On contradiction and grammaticality
Recall that in Chapter 1 I have followed Gajewski (2002) in claiming that we need to
distinguish between analyticity that results from the logical constants alone, from
analyticity that is the result of the non-logical vocabulary. I have also adopted
Gajewski's proposal according to which the former plays an important role for natural
language: he argues that sentences that express a contradiction or tautology by virtue of
their logical constants are ungrammatical. In other words he argues that it is L-
analyticity, as opposed to plain contradiction, that leads to ungrammaticality. If it is
correct that Gajewski (2002)'s proposal can be used to explain the ungrammaticality that
we observe in the case of weak islands, then we should show that complete answers to
negative manner questions are L-analytical. What we are looking for is to show that a
complete answer to a negative manner question remains ungrammatical under any
variable assignment. This is indeed the case. This is because for any predicate of manners
p, the set of alternatives will always contain its contrary manner p' as well as a third
manner predicate pM that expresses that the event was neither p nor p'. This will have the
consequence that the set of propositions that a complete answer to a negative manner
question requires to be true is always incoherent. Thus complete answers to a negative
manner question are L-analytic, and hence, predicted to be ungrammatical by Gajewski
(2002)'s condition.
2.2.3 Blindness
One might wonder why it is that the examples below do not make the negative manner
questions grammatical16 :
(37) A: *How didn't John behave?
B: Politely, e.g.
B' Not politely.
(38) *Bill was surprised how John didn't behave.
In other words, there are contexts by which a non-complete or mention-some answer can
be forced, suggested or at least made possible. The marker e.g. explicitly signals that the
answer is non-complete (cf. e.g. Beck and Rullmann (1999) on discussion), and as such
the answer in (37)B should be contradiction-free. If so, we might expect that the
existence of this answer should make the question itself grammatical. Negative term
answers as (37)B' are usually also not interpreted as complete answers, as can be seen in
exchanges such as Who came? Not John. 17 Finally, some verbs that embed questions
16 (37)B was pointed out to me by Irene Heim and David Pesetsky (pc), while (37)B' and (38) were
brought to my attention by Emmanuel Chemla (pc)
Although von Stechow and Zimmermann (1984) report somewhat different judgements from mine and
Spector (2003). On the other hand, if a negative term answer were to be interpreted exhaustively, then if we
with their weak meaning, such as surprise or predict might in fact be true under a "very
weak" meaning: one might be surprised by who came, if one expected only a subset of
the people among those who came to come. (cf. Lahiri (1991), Lahiri (2002)). In these
cases too, we might expect the sentences to improve, contrary to fact." Why is it that
these instances of partial answers do not make negative manner questions good? In other
words, since grammar also allows for weaker than strongly exhaustive readings, why can
the hearer not recalibrate the condition on complete answers into a weaker requirement,
that of giving a partial answer?
I would like to argue that this apparent problem is in fact part of larger issue of
the impenetrability of the linguistic system for non-linguistic reasoning, or reasoning
based on common knowledge. As the requirement of the linguistic system is that a
complete answer should be possible to a question, in the rare cases where this leads to a
contradiction, we cannot access and recalibrate the rules for the felicity conditions on a
question. Similar conclusions about the modularity of the various aspects of the linguistic
systems were reached by Fox (2000) and Fox and Hackl (2005) about the nature of the
Deductive System (DS) that he proposes, as well as in the above discussed Gajewski
(2002). Similarly, Magri (2006) and subsequent work argues based on various examples
that implicature computation should be blind to common knowledge. I contend then that
the above observed impossibility of scaling down on our requirements based on
contextual knowledge is part of a larger pattern of phenomena, where such adjustments to
the core principles seem to be unavailable19.
2.3 Ways to rescue Negative Islands
It was already mentioned briefly that explicit context restriction can rescue negative
manner questions, as first observed by Kroch (1989). A second way to save negative
island violations has been discovered by Fox and Hackl (2005) (partly based on Kuno
and Takami (1997)): negative islands become perfectly acceptable if an existential modal
only have three alternatives: {politely, impolitely, mid-politely} we should infer from the answer in (37)B'
that John behaved politely, and in no other way, which is not a contradiction in itself.
18 The examples with predict seem better, however on should be cautious: Given that predict selects for
future tense, these examples are in fact parallel to the cases with modals, discussed in the next section.
Their acceptability therefore should get the same explanation as that of the modals.
19 Thanks to Giorgio Magri for discussion on this issue.
appears under negation. This section shows that both of these facts are predicted by the
present account in a straightforward manner.
2.3.1 Modals
Fox and Hackl (2005) (partly based on observations by Kuno and Takami (1997)) have
noted that certain modals can save negative island violations: more precisely negative
islands can be saved by inserting existential modals below negation or by inserting
universal modals above negation:
(39) How is John not allowed to behave?
(40) How did John certainly not behave?
The reason why these are predicted to be good in our system is that the contrary
alternatives that are required to be true by exhaustive interpretation of the complete
answer can be distributed over different possible worlds, hence the contradiction can be
avoided: Notice that unlike before, we are not talking about a specific event any more,
but the event is existentially quantified over. The existential quantification is presumably
provided by the existential modal.
(41) [How is John not allowed to behave?]
={--,3w 3e [behave (w)(e)(John) A qmanner (w)(e)] I qmamer EDM}
Imagine again a scenario, in which we have restricted the domain to the dimansion of
politeness. As before, the set of alternatives will at least include three contrary predicates:
politely, impolitely and neither politely nor impolitely (represented below as med-
politely)
(42) a. John is not allowed to behave impolitely.
b. 03e 03e 
_ -03e
politely med-politely impolitely
There is no obstacle in this case for choosing a complete answer, e.g. (42) above. This is
because it might be the case that impolitely is indeed the only manner in which John is
not allowed to behave, and in every other manners he is allowed to behave. In other
words, it is allowed that there be an event of John behaving in a polite manner, and that
there be another event of John behaving in a med-polite manner. The contradiction is
resolved by distributing predicates over different worlds and events. Since universal
modals above negation are equivalent to existential modals below negation, the same
reasoning holds for (40) as well20. On the other hand we predict manner questions where
universal modals can be found under negation to be unacceptable. This is because in this
case, instead of distributing the mutually exclusive propositions over different worlds, we
require them to be true in every possible world, which of course is impossible (Notice
that assuming as before that the universal modal quantifies over worlds and events, the
event variable is now universally quantified over)
(43) *How is John not required to behave?
(44) IHow is John not required to behave?]
={-Vw Ve [behave (w)(e)(John) A qmanner (w)(e)] I qmanner EDM}
Why is the sentence in (45) below not a good complete answer?
(45) a. #John is not required to behave impolitely.
b. oVe oVe --,oVe
politely med-politely impolitely
20 However, notice that ability modals seem to be more complicated then the existential modals above
(1) *How can't you photograph the house? (cf Kuno and Takami (1997))
(2) *How are you not able to eat a mango?
But notice that in these cases also the corresponding positive questions don't seem to be good:
(3) ???how can you photograph the house?
(4) ???how are you able to eat a mango?
Though the positive cases improve with past tense:
(5) How could you solve the exercise
I have no explanation for these facts, however I suspect that the problem in these cases arises from the
actuality entailment of ability modals in some contexts (cf. Hacquard (2006)).
The problem is that if impolitely is the unique manner such that John is not required to
behave that way, then for the other two alternatives it must be the case that John is
required to behave in that manner: However, this is again a contradiction as these manner
predicates are exclusive. Furthermore, just as we have seen before in the case of non-
modal negative manners, it is not possible to form incoherent plural manners, therefore
an answer such as #John is not required to behave politely and impolitely will not be
possible either. It should be noted here that Fox (2007)'s generalization of the problem of
symmetrical alternatives and the cases discussed in Fox and Hackl (2005) extends to the
above reasoning. I will return to this in Section 5 of this Chapter.
2.3.2 Explicit domains
If we restrict the set of possible answers in appropriate ways, we might get rid of the
contradictions that cause problems. An example of this effect might be if we simply list
the potential alternatives. The relevant observation goes back to Kroch (1989):
(46) How did you not behave: A-nicely, B-politely, C-kindly?
In this case the set of alternatives is restricted to the non-plural manners A,B,C, (and
potentially the sets that can be formed of these, depending on the rules of the multiple
choice test). As this set does not have to contain any contraries, the difficulties that lead
to weak island violation does not arise here, and hence the sentence is predicted to be
good. This is because by restricting the domain it becomes possible to choose a predicate
among the alternatives such that it is a complete answer to the question, and it is does not
lead to any contradiction. In fact in the above example there are no contraries at all,
therefore any answer based on these alternatives can in principle be a good answer.
Similarly, it is easy to see that in most explicitly listed domains it will be possible to
select a complete answer, at least as long as the domain does not contain more than two
mutually exclusive manner predicates per each dimension of manners. In fact we predict
that if the list contained three predicates of manners that are mutually contraries to each
other, the question should still be bad. I think that this prediction is indeed borne out:
(47) *How do you not speak French?
The problem is that on the one hand a complete answer such as I do not speak French
[a+fl] violates the presupposition against forming incoherent manner predicates, but the
complete answer I speak French a leads to a contradiction.
2.4 Interim summary
In this section I have argued that the felicity condition on asking a question according to
which the speaker should be able to assume that the hearer might be able to know the
most informative answer can never be met in the case of negative manner questions. This
was because the domain of manners contained atoms that were not independent form
each other: the domain of manners contained contraries. Therefore a truth of an (atomic)
proposition in the Hamblin denotation of such questions had consequences for the truth
of other atomic propositions. This state of affairs in the case of negative questions
resulted in a situation in which it was not possible to select a maximal answer.
3 Negative islands with degree questions
This section looks at negative degree questions. The basic contrast to be explained is the
one exemplified below: while the positive degree questions are perfectly acceptable (48),
their negative counterparts in (49) are not:
(48) a. How many children does John have?
b. How much milk did John spill on his shirt?
(49) a. *How many children doesn't John have?
b. *How much milk didn't John spill on his shirt?
This chapter proposes a novel explanation as to where this difference might be stemming
from.
An interesting observation about negative degree questions that is made in Fox
and Hackl (2005) and Spector (2004) is useful to keep in mind. When the sentence is
A: very well B: so-so C: badly
acceptable, for example because it contains an existential quantifier under negation, an
answer to it can be interpreted in two ways:
(50) a. How much are you sure that this vessel won't weigh? (=(5))
b. 5 tons.
i. 'I am sure that this vessel will not weigh exactly 5 tons'
ii. 'I am sure that this vessel will not weigh 5 tons or more'
A second observation about the context-dependence of the second, 'at least' reading is
that in fact it can be fairly easily turned into an 'at most' reading depending on world
knowledge/context 21 (similar facts about context-reversability of the scales induced were
noted e.g. in Horn (1992), Geurts (2006) and others):
(51) a. How much did no one score?
b. 10 points.
Suppose we are playing a game where what is hard is to score a lot of points: The answer
seems to imply that 'No one scored ten or more points' on the other hand, imagine now
that we are playing golf, where what is hard is to score 1 point, while scoring lots of
points is easy: the answer seems to imply 'no one scored ten or less points'. Let's look at
another example to illustrate the same point:
(52) a. How many children are we not allowed to have?
b. 2.
Most certainly, the answer "2" above can be interpreted as 'two or more' in a context
where the problem seems to be overpopulation (E.g. China). Less easily perhaps, but
conceivably the answer "2" can also be interpreted as 'two or less' if we are talking about
a context where the problem is that not enough children are born (E.g. some orthodox
neighborhoods).
21 I believe this was brought to my attention by E. Chemla.
3.1 Towards an account
This section aims to show that the problem of negative degree questions can be reduced
to the problem of having symmetrical alternatives. The section is composed of two parts:
the first part (Section 3.1.) introduces a toy account that will pave the way for the actual
account to be proposed in Section 3.2.
3.1.1 Exact meanings
Imagine that we wanted to keep the idea from Fox and Hackl (2005) that degree
questions ask for the most informative answer, but without the density assumption. We
have seen in Chapter 2 that this so far predicts that the negative degree questions should
be good. Yet perhaps it is still possible to avoid this conclusion. Here is how we could
start to reason: It seems that on the basis of the examples discussed in the previous
section, we could draw the following empirical generalization:
(53) Empirical generalization about negative degree questions:
i. A degree question is bad if it is contradictory under the exact reading of
the numeral
ii. When a degree question is grammatical, it is ambiguous between an exact
and an at least lat most reading.
Why should this be? First we should observe that if numerals have exact readings in the
basic degree questions, then any complete answer to a negative question will require that
a number of mutually incompatible statements should hold at the same time.
(54) [How many apples didn't John eat?] = {John didn't eat exactly n apples I nNN+}
Clearly, if e.g. John ate 3 apples, there is no most informative answer among the true
propositions in (54). If a modal expression of the right type intervenes however, there
might be a most informative answer. This is because as soon as we distribute the
mutually exclusive alternatives over different times/worlds/individuals, the contradiction
disappears. [This is then a very similar reasoning to that found in Chierchia (2004),
Menendez-Benito (2005) Fox (2006) for free choice and also Guerzoni (2003) for
German auch nur]
(55) [How much radiation are we not allowed to expose our workers to?]
={we are not allowed to expose our workers to n radiation j ne N }I
={ -n 3w' Acc(w,w') we expose our workers to exactly n radiation I neN+)
It is easy to see that in this case there might be a most informative answer. E.g. it might
be the case that we are not allowed to expose our workers to exactly 76 millisievers/year,
but more or less is acceptable. In this case "76" can in fact be the complete answer, and
we do not run into contradiction. Similarly, an existential quantifiers over individuals can
remedy the problem as well:
(56) [How much did no one score?] ={-,3x. x scored exactly n I neN ÷}
If, for example 77 is the only amount such that no one scored that much, then "77" might
in fact be the complete answer to the above question. What we can observe then is that
while a plain negative question such as (54) will not have a maximally informative
answer in any context, there are contexts that make (55) and (56) acceptable.
A universal modal under negation on the other hand do not dissolve the problem
like the existential modal above did:
(57) [ How much radiation are we not required to expose our workers to ?]
=-{ _ Vw' Acc(w,w') we expose our workers to exactly amount n radiationj n N+}
In this case again there can be no most informative answer: a proposition of the form 'we
are not required to expose our workers to d radiation' could only be a complete answer, if
it was possible that the two propositions that we are required to expose our workers to
exactly d+1 radiation and that we are required to expose workers to exactly d+2 amount
of radiation be true in the same world. As these are contradictory however, there cannot
be such world. Therefore, there cannot be a complete answer to such questions. We see
then why the exact readings predict that the plain negative numeral questions should be
ungrammatical, but that an existential quantifier under negation or a universal quantifier
above negation should remedy the situation. Note that this reasoning about modal
obviation in negative degree questions relates in a direct way to some analyses of the
interaction of modals with polarity items: cf. e.g. Chierchia (2004), Menendez-Benito
(2005) Fox (2006), Guerzoni (2003) for some related analyses of polarity items.
Thus we have seen that negative degree questions that contain an existential
quantifier under negation have a non-contradictory complete answer assuming that the
meaning of the numeral is 'exact' in questions. But we also know that when these
questions are grammatical, they are in fact ambiguous between the exact and an 'at least'/
'at most' readings. How should we derive this? We can observe first that even though the
question alternatives are exclusive, and hence they are not ordered by entailment, they
might be still ordered by likelihood/scale of difficulty etc. (for example by how hard it is
to score, assumptions about laws, etc). Now suppose that we are in a context in which in
fact many of the alternatives in the question denotation are true: E.g no one scored
exactly 10, exactly 11, exactly 12.... ad infinitum) Now, the situation is very similar to a
mention-some question: we have a number of alternatives that are true, and that do not
entail each other, but are ordered in terms of some pragmatic
consideration/likelihood/relevance etc. The complete answer should choose the most
relevant answer.
How do we achieve this? Recall that so far we have been assuming that a
complete answer yields the most informative true answer among the true propositions.
Yet, as the existence of mention-some questions shows, this cannot be the only type of
legitimate answer. We could therefore attempt at a broader generalization, one that
encompasses the previous notion of a complete answer, as well as predicting the
existence of mention-some questions [cf. van Rooy (2003), van Rooy and Schulz (2005)
for a related proposal]: A complete answer then will say that p is the most relevant true
answer among the question alternatives. Naturally, if the alternatives are ordered by
entailment, then 'less relevant' will be interpreted as 'entailed'.
(58) For Q, a set of alternative propositions to a Question, and IlalJE Q
Exh(a)=a & A {p I p Excl(Q)}
where
Excl(Q) is the set of excludable alternatives in Q, here the alternatives that
are not less relevant than a.
In the case of a typical mention-some question, such as (59), an answer such as "two
blocks from here" will imply that is the most relevant true answer, in other words there is
no easier/less effortful/relevant way of getting an Italian newspaper. Of course, it does
not imply that one cannot get an Italian newspaper in Rome, but unless we are in Rome
that fact will not be relevant.
(59) Where can I get an Italian newspaper?
Similarly, a degree question then could invoke a mention-some answer. I will present this
idea here only very impressionistically, for the reason that this is not the proposal that I
will adopt. Take a question like the one below:
(60) How much can you score?
Intuitively, if we are in a context in which scoring a lot of points is hard, while scoring
little is relatively easy, that maximal degree such that you can score exactly that much
will be at the same time the most relevant answer. If we were in a context in which it
was difficult to score few points, but easy to score a lot of points, then the minimal
degree should be the most relevant at the same time. In the case of a negative question,
on the other hand, if not scoring a lot is what is hard/expected, then not scoring less is
more noteworthy than not scoring more. Therefore the proposition that no one scored n
is more noteworthy than the proposition that no one scored n+1. Thus the complete
answer to (61) "no one scored exactly 4" will mean that none of the more desirable/more
relevant worlds are true, i.e. someone scored exactly 3 or less.
(61) How much did no one score?
3.1.2. The problem for this view
There is however a major problem for an attempt at explaining negative degree questions
along the lines outlined in the previous section. The above view essentially proposes that
numerals should have the exact reading as their basic meaning, while we can derive the
'at least' reading of answers via a pragmatic mechanism, in our case resorting to
mention-some questions. However the view that numerals have exact readings only,
cannot be maintained. There are at least 2 main problems for such accounts, listed below:
(62)
i. A sentence like I have 3 children, in fact I have 5 should be a plain
contradiction. But it is not.
ii. The 'at least' reading of sentences like You must eat 5 apples cannot be
derived pragmatically, as pointed out in Geurts (2006). This is because if
the semantic meaning of the numeral is the exact sense (You must eat
exactly 5 apples), then the 'at least' reading cannot arise as a pragmatic
inference, because such inference would contradict the assertion.
However, implicatures can never overwrite the assertion on which they are
based.
Of course one could still try to argue that numerals are semantically ambiguous between
the 'exact' and the 'at least' sense, but for some reason in degree questions the 'at least'
construal is blocked. (e.g. Spector (2004) presents an account approximately along these
lines.) However, such a proposal unfortunately cannot be successfully argued either.
This problem is exemplified with sentences of the type below22:
22 As pointed out to me by Danny Fox.
(63) How tall are you required to be to be a basketball player?
The problem is that an answer to this question such as "180cm" seems to be compatible
with the at least reading, in fact that is the most natural understanding of such an answer.
However, this is in fact incompatible with what should be the semantic meaning of this
question based on what has been said above. This is because if one is required to be
exactly 180cm, tall to be a basketball player, that in fact excludes a situation where one is
181cm and one is a basketball player. This runs contrary to our intuitions in this case
however.
One way of how to get out of this conundrum could be to assume that the question
above in fact has some representation akin to the following:
(64) [(63)] = {n I if you are exactly n-you can be a basketball player}
However, it is not easy to see how this interpretation could be derived in a compositional
fashion from (63). Luckily, we do not have to resort though to some Deus ex Machina:
and this is because by changing one aspect of the above outlined theory this problem
disappears. This is the topic of the next section.
3.2. The Solution Proposed
The solution in this section is based on a suggestion made by Benjamin Spector (pc) to
use a degree semantics based on intervals to remedy the problem with require. Such an
account of degree constructions was originally proposed in Schwarzschild and Wilkinson
(2002), and was also adopted (with some modifications) by Heim (2006). As it turns out,
adopting an interval based degree semantics results in a much more elegant theory overall
than the one outlined in the previous section: while preserving all the good aspects of the
previous version, it does not force us to adopt some of the more dubious aspects.
3.2.1. Degree semantics based on intervals: Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002),
Heim (2006).
A long-standing problem in the domain of comparatives is the puzzle that is exemplified
by sentences such as (65) below: (cf. Heim (2006) and references therein)
(65) John is taller than every girl is.
a. Actual meaning: 'for every girl x: John is taller than x'
b. Predicted meaning : 'John is taller than the degree d such that every girl is
tall to that degree d. '
The puzzle is constituted by the fact that the universal quantifier appears to take scope
over the comparative adjective, which given well-known (strong)-island constraints
should be impossible. Moreover, the reading in (65) is not only possible, but in fact
obligatory, which casts further doubt on an analysis that would try to account for this fact
in terms of a scope ambiguity. (For further arguments and references cf. Schwarzschild
and Wilkinson (2002)) The (only) two recent solutions to this problem, Schwarzschild
and Wilkinson (2002) and Heim (2006) both23 propose that adjectives denote relations
between individuals and intervals (sets of degrees) (67), instead of the more traditional
assumption according to which adjectives denote a relation between individuals and
degrees (66):
(66) More traditional analyses of adjectives (cf. von Stechow (1984), Rullmann
(1995), Kennedy (1997) and others)
[tall]=Xdd. XXe. x's height >d or [tall]=Xdd. XXe. x's height =d
(67) The analyses of Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002), Heim (2006):
[tall]=XD<d,t>-. Xe. x's height ED
23 This is a simplification of the actual proposal in Heim (2006), as we will see.
I will adopt here the version according to which the sets of degrees in question in fact
correspond to intervals. Now a sentence such as John is tall will denote the following
[crucially, I will depart from Heim (2006) and follow Schwarzschild and Wilkinson
(2002) in assuming that intervalhood (as opposed to mere sets of degrees) plays a role]:
(68) a. [John is I-tall]=l iff John's height eI ; where I is an interval:
b. A set of degrees D is an interval iff
For all d, d', d": if de D & d"E D & dd'<d", then d'e D
I will assume that the natural language degree expression 5 feet might denote two
intervals: the interval [5,5] (which is just a singleton set of degrees) or the interval [5,oo).
As a consequence, in a sentence such as John is 5 feet tall the degree argument of the
adjective is bound either by the point-like interval that corresponds to 5 feet, or by the
open interval that corresponds to 5 feet. These two possibilities derive the fact that the
sentence John is 5feet tall has two readings: the 'exact' and the 'at least' reading
3.2.2 The Analysis
Positive degree questions First let's look at a positive degree question, such as (69)
below. Recall the assumption that we are looking for the most informative true
proposition among the question alternatives. The alternative propositions in this case
range over different intervals that could be the argument of the adjective:
(69) [How tall is John?]= {John's height is EI IIE DI}
Naturally, there are many intervals for which it is true that John's height (a point) is
contained in them. These intervals overlap. I will say that an interval K covers interval I,
if for every degree d that is an element of I, K contains that element. (In other words, I is
a subset of K.) It is easy to see then that the truth of John's height EI, will entail the truth
of John's heightE K, for every K that covers I.
(70) an interval I is covered by interval K iff
for all d: de I then de K
(71) ----- (--(-- {----[ dj ] -------- )I2------- 13--- )I4-----------
In the picture above in (71), John's height is represented by d. The truth of John's height
ElI, entails the truth of John's height EI2 and so on. Now, when we are looking for the
most informative answer among the true answers, this will be the smallest interval such
that John's height is contained in it. Thus there will always be a most informative
proposition among the true propositions: John's height e { dj }.
Negative degree questions In the case of a negative degree question the situation is
different: we are now looking for the maximal interval among the intervals in which
John's height is not contained. Given that the entailment pattern is reversed because of
negation, if K covers I, the truth of John's height 0 K will entail the truth of Johns height
L. We are then looking for the biggest interval such that John's height is not contained
in it. The problem is that there is no such interval.
(72) [*How tall isn't John?]= { -John's height is ei I D1I}
The reason why there cannot be such an interval is because intervals are continuous.
Therefore, for any two intervals I and K, such as I is wholly below d, and K is wholly
above K, there cannot be an interval which covers both I and K, but does not contain d.
However, this is exactly what is required by the question.
(73) an interval I is wholly below d iff
for all d': d'EI d'<d
(74) --- [----------------------] I2--dj -- { -------------- 1s---
In the picture above for example the interval I2 is wholly below dj, while the interval 13 is
wholly above dj. There is no maximal interval that covers both of these intervals, but does
not cover dj. Therefore, there cannot be a most informative element among the true
alternatives, and the question is predicted to be bad. Given that John's height in the actual
world corresponds to a single point on the scale, this situation is in fact unavoidable, as
long as John has any height. Indeed it seems to be a presupposition of degree questions
that the answer is not-zero. In the case of asking about John's height this is a trivial fact
about the world. In the case of a question such as How many apples did you eat? if no
apples were eaten, then a natural answer is the refutation of the presupposition: "I did not
eat any apples" instead of rather odd "#Zero". Notice also that for the reasoning outlined
above contextually given levels of granularity do not make any difference: any level of
granularity will lead to a contradiction, as long as the domain of degrees contains at least
3 degrees.
Quantifiers in the question As we have seen above, certain quantifiers can
rescue negative degree questions. Why should this be? The reason is that now there can
be scenarios in which it is possible to find a maximal interval. Let's take a question such
as (75) below:
(75) [How many books are you not allowed to read?]
= {13w'Acc(w,w') [ the number of books you read in w' is in I] I IeD,}
Imagine that you are allowed to read any number of books below 5. Then there is a
possible world in which you read 1 book, another in which you read 2 books etc. up till 4.
This situation is depicted below:
(76) dwl dw2 dw3 dw4 [-------- {--(------------}--)---].-------
The intervals which do not contain any degree such that you are allowed to read that
number of books are all wholly above d4. Therefore there will be a maximal interval such
that it does not contain any number of books that you are allowed to read: namely the
interval [5, o).
Another scenario in which the question might have a most informative answer is a
scenario in which one is allowed to read all numbers of books, except it so happens that
reading exactly 5 books is prohibited: in this case the only interval for which it is true that
you are not allowed to read that number of books is the interval which corresponds to the
singleton set { d5 }, exactly 5.
(77) dsl ds2 ds3 ds4 [d5s] ds6 ds7 dss d...
This reasoning derives then the ambiguity that was pointed out in the introduction of this
section in connection with example (50).
In the case of universal modals under negation the situation is again different. But
before we turn to that, let's look at positive degree questions that contain a universal
modal, such as the question in (63) above. We have seen that for the earlier version of
this analysis the questions with a universal modal such as require constituted a problem.
However, now that problem disappears. Recall what the problematic question was:
(78) [How tall are you required to be (to be a basketball player)?]
= {VW'Acc(w,w') [your height is in I in w' ] Ie( Dr}
The problem was that it seemed possible to answer "at least 180cm", but this was
predicted to be impossible by that proposal. Now however the situation is different:
Suppose the fact is that you indeed have to be more than 180cm to be a basketball player.
Then the smallest interval such that it is true that your height has to be in that interval, is
the interval K: [180, oo). For any interval that is properly contained in this interval it is
not true that your height has to be in that interval. For example for the interval [185, oo) it
is not true that your height has to be in that interval to be a basketball player, since in fact
you might as well be 183 and a happy basketball player. For any interval that properly
contains K, it will be true that your height is required to be in that interval, but these will
be less informative. Given that that the interval [180, oo) is the smallest interval such that
your height is required to be in it, the proposition that your height is required to be in the
interval [180, co) will be the most informative proposition in this case.
(79) --------- --------- [dsocm----------------------- -I]K}
In the case of a negative degree question that contains a universal quantifier under
negation however the situation is different:
(80) [*How tall are you not required to be (to be a basketball player)?]
= {- VW'Acc(w,w') [your height is in I in w' ] I IeDI}
Suppose that the actual situation in the world is the same, namely you are required to be
at least 180cm to be a basketball player, let's name this interval K. Let's take two
intervals, for which it is true that it is not the case that your height is required to be in that
interval: 11 and 12, such that I, is wholly below K, while 12 is covered by K:
(81) -- ( --------- 11------- [dlsocm (--------(------ 0)I2 K )N
An interval that covers both of these intervals (let's name it N) is not an interval for
which it is not true that in every accessible world your height is contained in this interval.
Quite the opposite, in fact in every accessible world, your height will be contained in N.
Now again, similarly to the basic cases, we run into a situation such that among the set of
true answers there is no maximally true one, one that would entail all and only the other
true answers.
3.2.3. A potential problem?
Danny Fox (pc) has raised the following objection. Suppose you have to drive faster than
40m/h, but less than 70m/h. Now suppose someone asks:
(82) How fast must you drive?
It would seem that it is possible to answer: (at least) 40m/h. Why is it that we do not
have to say "between 40 and 70 m/h"?
We could perhaps say that this objection could be addressed by saying that in fact
all that is happening here is that domain restriction is at play24. If we assume that it is
common ground that you are not allowed to drive faster than 70m/h, then it is possible to
assume that the hearer takes this fact as natural domain restriction. Then given this
domain restriction "at least 40" will be de facto interpreted as 'between 40 and 70'. One
might still ask why is it that the answer "40" might mean 'at least 40', while in the same
context, an answer such as "70" cannot be understood as "70 or less (up to 40)". One
way to address this objection could be by resorting to the assumption that was introduced
above, according to which numeral expressions might denote intervals such as [x,x] or
[x,oo), but not intervals of the form (0,x]. Our opponent might still strike back pointing
out that if we ask a question such as the one in (83), in the same context as was
introduced above, the preferred reading of the answer "70" is in fact '70 or less', in other
words the numeral in this case should be able to denote an interval of the form (0,x].
(83) How slow must you drive?
As it seems difficult to maneuver out of this comer, we might then try to address
the objection in a different, more technical way. [This was suggested to me by Benjamin
Spector (pc)]. This version would say that what we are observing in this case is that the
H-operator of Schwarzschild (2004) and Heim (2006) can take different scopes. But at
this point we need to introduce some more background.
As we have said before, the above authors argue that degree adjectives should be
thought of as relations between individuals and sets of degrees (intervals). But is this
meaning basic or is it derived from something else? Schwarzschild (2004) and Heim
(2006) argue that in fact it is derived by an invisible operator called the HI operator. More
precisely, the meaning of a degree adjective such as fast is both (84) or (85), but the
second one is more basic: we can derive (84) from (85) via composing the adjective root
with an invisible r operator:
(84) [fast1]=•D<d,t>*. XXe. x's speed eD
(85) Ifast 2l=Xd. Xxe. x's speed >d
(86) [I]=2)D<d,t>. <LPd,t>. max(P)e D
It seems harmless to reverse the order of arguments of the H operator: so let's do it: (I
have also switched back to intervals from Heim (2006)'s formulation):
(87) I[HI]=XP<d,t>. ?dd,t>. max(P)e I
Given this, now we can say that a question such as How tall is John? has the following
meaning (crucially for the present account, the presence of the H operator is not optional,
but obligatory):
(88) [How fast is John?]
= 'for what I. I [H. Xd John is d-fast]?'
= {[r. Xd John is d-fast](I)I IEDI}
={max(kd. John is d-fast)E I IEDI}
Now, inspired by Heim (2006)'s treatment of examples such as He is faster than he needs
to be, we can say that H could scope above or below require. Suppose now that in fact
John is required to be between 160 and 180 cm. Then we have the two possibilities as
shown below:
24 Thanks to Gennaro Chierchia for discussion on this.
(89) [How fast is John required to be?]
(a)
= 'for what interval I is it required I [I. •1 John is d-fast]'
={it is required that max(kd. John is d-fast)e I I Ie DI}
the speed of John
or:
(b)
= 'for what interval I .D [HI. Xd it is required that John is d-fast]'
={ max(kd. It is required that John is d-fast)e I I I- DI}
the speed that John is required to be at least that fast
The construal on which the II operator has narrow scope in ((89)a is equivalent to the
type of reading that we have seen in (78) above. On the other hand, the construal on
which the HI operator has wide scope in ((89)b corresponds to the reading that the
example by Fox seems to have. This is because in this case now we are looking for the
interval, which contains the height such that John is required to be at least that tall, and
which is also the most informative such interval. In our case, this interval will be the
singleton set { 160}.
It seems that this proposal stands a better chance against the objection raised in
connection with slow before in (83). This is because now one of the predicted readings of
this sentence is as shown below:
(90) [How slow are you required to drive?]
={ max(kd. It is required that you drive d-slow)eI I Ie DI}
the speed that you are required to drive at least that slow
This now in fact correctly picks out the upper end of interval [40,70].
One final issues should still be pointed out however. As it is, this proposal
predicts a flat ambiguity. In the cases reviewed above this ambiguity seems to be needed.
For example the question in (82) in the context described above, might indeed be
saliently answered both by [40,70], or [40,oo). On the other hand, it is interesting to
observe that sometimes it seems that it is not the case that both readings are equally
available. Imagine the following scenario 25: I am driving 120 m/h in my Ferrari, when a
policeman stops me. I innocently ask:
(91) Why did you stop me? How fast must I drive?
It seems that the above question is funny. The reason for this is that it seems to suggest
that the problem might be I was not driving fast enough. But this means that the reading
of the type exemplified in (89)a is for some reason not easily available here. At present, I
do not yet understand why this should be.
3.2.4. Kroch-examples
A nice aspect of the present proposal is that the granularity of the scales involved does
not play any role: the scale might be dense (as in the case of heights, eg.) or discreet (as
in the case of children), the ungrammaticality of negative degree questions is equally
predicted. As a consequence, we do not need to impose any restrictions on how the
context can interact with the module of grammar that is sensitive to contradictions. In fact
the felicity condition on questions introduced in the previous chapter can simply apply at
the level of truth conditions.
Let's return here briefly to some of the properties of negative degree questions
that were introduced in the introductory section. Recall the examples based on Kroch
(1989) that showed that an explicit choice of answers seemed to make the question
acceptable:
(92) Among the following, how many points did Iverson not score?
A. :20 B.30 C.40 D.50
25 This example is due to Giorgio Magri (pc).
Notice that a felicitous answer "B" seems to imply that there were many events of
Iverson scoring. The Answer "b" suggests that among the alternatives given, B is the
only one to which no scoring event corresponds. Thus what is happening in these
examples is not so much that the quantificational domain gets restricted, but rather that
the choice of alternatives invokes a number of different events. Once the scorings can be
distributed over various events, the contradiction disappears, much in the same way as in
the case of modals and other quantifiers. This example thus also points in the direction of
the fact that was also observed with the examples where the presence of a quantifier
seemed to obviate the weak island effect. A felicitous answer to these examples seemed
to imply the truth of a range of alternatives. In fact if different alternative events are not
easily available, even a restricted question of the sort shown above seems to be odd:
(93) #Among the following, how many children don't you have?
A. 2 B.3 C.4 D.5
This fact is straightforwardly predicted by the present account, but not by any other
account.
3.3 Interim summary of negative degree questions
In this section I have shown that an interval-based semantics for degrees predicts that
negative degree questions will not have a maximal answer. This was because in these
cases there was no single interval that covered all and only the degrees for which the
negative predicate was true. As a consequence, any complete answer to negative degree
questions amounts to a statement of a contradiction.
4. Negative island-like phenomena based on the same logic:
In this section, I return to the examples mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the
oddness of which can be explained by the same reasoning as we have seen for the manner
questions.
4.1 When
(94) *When did Mary not die?
(95) When didn't you feel happy?
As the above examples show, we observe marked ungrammaticality with final punctual
eventive verbs (e.g. die), but not with statives (e.g. be happy). It also seems that there is a
scale of acceptability judgements in between these two extremes. These facts can be
explained by the same logic as we have seen above: given that dying (or the more
optimistic resurrecting) is a pointlike event, there are infinite points in time such that it is
true that Mary did not die at these times. However, these a propositions are not ordered
by entailment. For this reason there is no maximally informative alternative among these
true propositions. With statives on the other hand, it is possible to construct a scenario
such that there is one maximal interval at which you did not feel happy.
4.2 Where
(96) *Where aren't you at the moment?
(97) Where hasn't Bill looked for the keys?
A very similar pattern can be seen with questions formed by where. The example in (96)
is deviant because it is not possible given the normal laws of our world to be at more than
one place at the same time: yet this is exactly what a complete answer to this question
would require. Assuming that spacial locations are point-like, there is no entailment
relationship between being at various places at any given time, in fact all these options
are mutually exclusive. Given this, and that there are always infinite points in space
where one is not at any given moment, there is no maximally informative answer to a
question like (96) On the other hand, it is perfectly possible for someone to have searched
for the keys at every salient place, except for one or two locations.
5. On symmetry
This last section of the present chapter proposes that the property of having symmetric
alternatives might be extended as a generalization for all cases where exhaustification
leads to contradiction. Let's first state the symmetry generalization:
(98) Symmetry
Let p be a proposition and A a set of propositions. For any p, there are at least 2
alternatives in A such that each of them can be denied consistently with p, but the
denial of both of these alternatives is inconsistent with p.
5.1 Symmetry and negative islands
Let's see informally how symmetry is manifested in the case of the interval-based
analysis of negative degree questions. Suppose there was an answer to (49)a, the interval
K; [3,o0). Exhaustifying this answer would imply that for all the intervals that are not
subintervals of K, the (exact) number of apples John has is contained in those intervals.
The intervals [0,1] and the intervals [2,0o) are for example such intervals. However, they
do not overlap, therefore it is impossible that the exact number of apples that John has be
contained in both of these. In other words, the simultaneous denial of the two alternatives
that the number of apples John has is[0,1] and that The number of apples that John has
is 4[2,oo) is inconsistent. Such a situation will always arise as long as John has any
apples, which in turn seems to be a presupposition of the question, as it was discussed
above.
Now let's observe how symmetry is manifested in my proposal of negative
manner questions. Recall the basic case of a negative manner question. Let's assume for
the sake of simplicity that that the context restricts the domain to the dimension of
politeness:
(99) a. *How didn't John behave?
b. Xp. 3qmanner [behave (w)(e*)(John) A - qmaner (w)(e*)]
c. {that John did not behave wisely,
that John did not behave unwisely,
that John did not behave neither wisely nor unwisely }
We can see that each alternative to any proposition p in the Hamblin denotation can be
denied consistently with p. However, as we have seen above, the denial of any two
alternatives at the same time leads to a contradiction.
5.2. Density vs. symmetry
Fox and Hackl (2005) propose that the account in terms of density that they offer for
negative degree questions [reviewed in Chapter 2 of this thesis] also explains certain
cases of missing implicatures such as the one below:
(100) John has more than 2 children
*Implicature: John has exactly 3 children
Without the density assumption, it seems that the implicature should be there: Among the
scalar alternatives to (100) John has more than ncard children, the alternative that John
has more than 3 children is the strongest. The negation of this alternative, together with
the assertion of the sentence should convey that John has exactly 3 children. Given the
density assumption, the predicted implicature is not present, because as a consequence of
the density assumption, more than 2 is a left-open interval, there can be no strongest
alternative among the scalar alternatives to (100). Importantly, the pattern of modal
obviation is exactly as it was observed with the cases of negative islands above. I refer
the reader for the details of the explanation to their paper. It is important to note however,
that Fox (2007) observes that the same pattern of behavior is observed with certain
disjunctions as with the cases that Fox and Hackl (2005) explain with the UDM. As he
notes, the account based on density does not extend to these examples:
(101) John has 3 or more children
*Implicature: John has exactly 3 children
Spector (2005) however agues that (101) is strengthened to:
(102) John has [exactly 3] or more children
Given this, the assertion in (101) together with its primary implicatures will look as
follows to the hearer:
(103) Bs(Ex3 v more) & -Bs(Ex3) & -B,(more than 3)
This however cannot be strengthened to (104), because that is a contradiction. Thus,
secondary implicatures cannot be computed in this case, and the hearer cannot assume
that the speaker is opinionated, hence the putative implicature will not arise
(104) # Bs (Ex3 v more) & Bs(-nEx3) & B,(-more than 3)
Thus Spector (2005) shows that the case in (101) is an instance of what came to be
known recently as the symmetry problem. (The problem itself goes back at least to Kroch
(1972) and it was one of the main reasons for the postulation of Horn-scales. The name
for the phenomenon is more recent and I believe that it was so named first in the lecture
notes of Heim and von Fintel, cf. also Sauerland (2004) etc). More generally the
symmetry problem arises when there are two alternatives to an assertion a that are both
stronger than a and could be excluded independently, yet the exclusion of both leads to a
contradiction. One such scenario is exemplified below:
a& 1
(105) a
a&- 3
In such situations, the assertion cannot be strengthened. Spector (2005) further goes on to
argue that in fact the example in (100) can be also reduced to the Symmetry problem, if
we assume that the alternatives to more than 2 should be {more than 3, exactly 3}.
Fox (2007) notes then that whatever the best explanation of (100) might be, it still
seems that density is needed for the cases of negative island violations that we have seen
above, while symmetry is at play in the case of (101). But given that these two sets of
data seem to exhibit the same modal obviation patterns, he argues that a common
generalization that subsumes both of these explanations is called for. He then indeed
proceeds to provide such a generalization about the cases where exhaustification is not
possible:
(106) Fox (2007)'s generalization
Let p be a proposition and A a set of propositions. p is non-exhaustifiable
given A: [NE (p)(A)] if the denial of all alternatives in A that are not entailed by
p is inconsistent with p.
(i) [NE(p)(A)] t- p& n{•-q:qc A &--,(p-q)}=0.
+= VwMAxinf(A)(w)•p
He proves that obviation by a universal, but not by existential quantification is a trivial
logical property of such sets:
(107) A universal modal eliminates Non-exhaustifiability:
If p is consistent, NE(Op,(ZA)) does not hold (even if NE(p,A) holds)
(where CA = { Op: pe A) })
Proof: Let the modal base for E in wo be {w:p(w)=l }. It is easy to see that for
every qe A, s.t., q is not entailed by p, there is a world in the modal base that
falsifies q.
(108) An existential modal does not eliminate Non-Exhaustifiability:
if NE(p,A) holds, so does NE(Op, OA) (where OA = { Op: pe A)})
Proof: Assume otherwise, and let MB be the modal base that satisfies Op but does
not satisfy any of the propositions in OA not entailed by Op (i.e. any of the
proposition 0q in OA such that q is not entailed by p). Since Op is true, 3we MB,
s.t. p(w)=1, wp. For each qeA, such that p does not entail q, q(wp)=0 since
[--q](w)=l. But this means that all non-entailed members of A could be denied
consistently, contrary to assumption.
The generalization about the NE sets of propositions subsumes both the cases of
symmetry and the cases of density. Thus the observed pattern of modal obviation has a
principled explanation in our system based on Fox (2007).
However, one question one might ask, whether we really need anything else than
symmetry? If the analysis of degree/manner questions proposed in this chapter is on the
right track then we might be able to retain a more restrictive generalization than that of
Fox (2007), and reduce all cases of non-exhaustifiability to the property of having
symmetric alternatives-modulo the problems cited in Fox (2007) for Spector (2005)'s
account. An advantage of the treatment in terms of symmetrical alternatives is that it
extends to presupposition islands, and other weak island violations-Which is the topic
of the next chapters.
Chapter 4
Presuppositional Islands
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we have seen that in the case of manner and degree questions that
contained negation the statement for any answer that it is the most informative answer
resulted in the statement of a contradiction. In this chapter we look at islands created by
presuppositional items, such as islands created by factive verbs, response-stance
predicates and extraposition. I will argue that islands created by adverbs of quantification
and only belong to this group as well. What is common in these items is that they all
presuppose their complement (or that the subject believes the complement to be true). I
will argue that in the case of these presuppositional items a similar condition is at work to
what we have seen in the case of negative islands: Albeit at a different level. In these
cases the contradiction arises at the level of presuppositions. For easier reference, let's
list the group of interveners here:
Factive verbs:
(1) a. Who did John regret that he invited to the party?
b. *How did John regret that he behaved at the party?
c. *How much milk does John regret that he spilled?
Response stance verbs
(2) a. Who did John deny that he invited to the party?
b. *How did John deny that he behaved at the party?
c. *How many children did John deny that he had?
Extrapositi
(3) a.
b.
c.
Adverbs of
(4) a.
b.
c.
Only NP:
(5) a.
b.
C.
Wn:
Who was it scandalous that John invited to the party?
*How was it scandalous that John behaved at the party?
*How much milk was it a surprise that John spilled on his shirt?
quantification:
Who did you invite a lot?
*How did you behave a lot?
*How much milk did you drink a lot?
Who did only John invite to the party?
??How did only John behave at the party?
*How much milk did only John spill?
All of the above interveners have been argued to presuppose (that someone believes) the
truth of their complement. If, as I have argued in Chapter 1, presuppositions project from
questions in a universal fashion, then the approach outlined in the previous chapter
according to which the domain of manners and degrees always contains symmetric
alternatives predicts that each of the unacceptable questions above should stand with a set
of contradictory presuppositions. As no consistent context can entail a contraditory set of
presuppositions, potential complete answers to such questions will not be assertable in
any context. Therefore, such questions will be judged as ungrammatical. (Similar
reasoning about contradictory presuppositions leading to ungrammaticality was proposed
in Heim (1984), Krifka (1995), Zucchi (1995), Lahiri (1998), Guerzoni (2003), Abels
(2004), Abrusan (2007).)
Recall from Chapter 1 that Heim (1983) and more recently Schlenker (2006a),
Schlenker (2007) have argued that quantified sentences trigger a universal
presupposition 26. In the case of a quantifier such as no one, e.g. this prediction indeed
seems to be borne out:
26 But cf. Beaver (1994) for different view on the projection of presuppositions from quantified sentences,
as well as Chemla (2007) for a discussion of empirical differences among various quantifiers.
(6) Quantified sentence: [Q:R(x)]Sp(x)
presupposition: [Vx: R(x)] p(x)
(7) None of these ten people knows that his mother is a spy.
presupposition: all of these 10 people's mother is a spy
I have argued following Heim (2001) and Guerzoni (2003) that presuppositions project
from questions in a universal fashion. The following examples illustrate this:
(8) Which of his three wives has John stopped beating?
Inference: John was beating all three of his wives
(9) Which of your three friends went to Paris again?
Inference: All of your three friends went to Paris at least once before
(10) Which of these ten boys do you regret that Bill invited?
Inference: You believe that Bill invited each of these ten boys
A question including a presuppositional item will therefore come with a set of
presuppositions: the presuppositions of all the propositional alternatives. However, as I
will show this set of presuppositions turns out to be contradictory in the case of manner
and degree questions. A set of contradictory presuppositions has the unpleasant
consequence that the sentence is unassertable in any context: this is because there is no
context in which all the presuppositions can be satisfied. Why will this set be
contradictory? In a sense the issue is the mirror image of the problem of symmetric
alternatives that we have seen before. In the previous chapter it seemed that the problem
was caused by the fact that there always were two alternatives among the set of
alternatives that had to be ruled out, yet could not be ruled out at the same time. Now,
there will always be two alternatives that are mutually incompatible, and yet will both
have to be part of the set of presuppositions of a complete answer. But since no context
can entail two mutually exclusive propositions, there will never be a context in which an
answer to manner or degree questions containing the above mentioned presuppositional
items can be asserted. In the case of questions about individuals however the alternatives
are independent from each other and hence no problem will arise. Let's look now at these
claims in more detail. In the next sections I show why factive verbs, response stance
verbs, extraposition and adverbs cause intervention, one by one. In the final part of this
chapter I will then show why certain contexts can in fact rescue presuppositional islands.
In the discussion that follows, I will alternate between talking about degrees in some
cases and about manners in others to avoid slowing down the discussion too much by
explaining the same type of reasoning twice over and over again. Instead, I will simply
indicate in each case how the other counterpart would work.
2. Factive Islands
The first part of this section looks at islands created by factive verbs. In the second part of
this section I will tentatively suggest that we also sometimes find intervention with verbs
such as tell that have been observed to be "part-time triggers" (cf. Schlenker (2006b)).
2.1. Islands created by true factive verbs
Let's start by examining questions about individuals containing a factive verb:
(11) [Who among these ten people do you regret that Bill invited?]
={ Xw. you regret that Bill invited x in wI xE De}
Recall that the verb regret triggers the following presupposition (Heim (1992), e.g.):
(12) x regrets that p
presupposes: x believes that p
Given the nature of the projection mechanism outlined above, the question in (11) will
stand with the presupposition that for every x in a given domain, you believe that Bill
invited x.
(13) presupposition of (11): VxeDe: you regret that Bill invited x
Thus in the case of a question about individuals there is no obstacle to satisfying the set
of presuppositions that the question has.
Let's turn now to manner and degree questions. The problem in these cases stems
from the fact that the alternatives in the question's denotation are not independent from
each other. The domain of manners contains contraries, therefore a universal
presupposition in the case of manner questions such as (14) will always lead to a
contradiction.
(14) a. *How does Mary regret that John fixed the car?
b. [How does Mary regret that John fixed the car?]
={ Xw. Mary regrets that John fixed the car in a in wI ae Dm }
c. presupposition of the question:
4 for every mannere DM: Mary believes that John fixed the car in that
manner
As I have argued in Chapter 2, even though the domain of manners might be covertly
restricted by the context, it will still always include pairs of contraries: for example any
domain of manners that includes properly will always include its contrary, and an
'elsewhere' manner. Therefore the domain will at least contain the set of manners
{properly, improperly, neither properly nor improperly}. However, it is not possible for
a single event to be an element of all these manners, because these manners are all
contraries. Therefore it is not possible for John to have fixed the car in all these ways, or
indeed in any two ways out of these three at the same time. Therefore a complete answer
to the question above will always presuppose that Mary has an incoherent set of beliefs.
In the case of a degree question such as (15) a complete answer will presuppose
that John believes that his score is included in every interval in the domain, clearly an
impossible state of affairs give that in any domain of degrees there will always be non-
overlapping intervals:
(15) a. *How much does John regret having scored?
b. [How much does John regret having scored?]
={Xw. John regrets that his score is elI in w I1DI}
c. presupposition of the question:
-for every interval in Di: John believes that his score is in that interval
As soon as the domain of degrees has as much as two degrees in it, d, and d2, the domain
of intervals will contain at least two exclusive intervals (sets of degrees): { di } and { d2).
Already this much is enough for John's belief set to be incoherent. [I will assume that in
domains which only contain a single degree, asking a degree question is infelicitous
because an answer to such a question is a tautology.]
It seems then that a complete answer of a manner and degree question that
contains a factive verb will always carry the presupposition that the subject has a
contradictory set of beliefs. This clearly cannot be a felicitous situation for asking a
question. Given this, there is no context in which the question can be felicitously asked,
and hence it will be ungrammatical.
2.2. Islands created by part-time triggers?
Some verbs can invoke a factive-like inference in some contexts, but not others (eg. tell,
learn, cf.Schlenker (2006b)). In this section I would like to tentatively suggest that some
of these verbs, when they stand in a context that they trigger the inference in question,
might also induce weak islands. The examples below illustrate the case of learn:
(16) How did you learn in school that France behaved during the Vichy regime?
(17) *How did you learn yesterday that Mary's leg hurts? (with intended
interpretation: I learned yesterday that Mary's leg hurts badly, e.g.)
However, one might object that learn in the above examples actually translates to several
different lexical items in many languages (eg. German, Hungarian), therefore it might be
the case that we are simply dealing with a factive version of learn in the above case.
Interestingly enough, in the case of tell, Hungarian might provide us with examples that
might show that the island-inducing property of part-time triggers comes and goes with
the unstable factive inference. It seems to me that in Hungarian whether or not tell stands
with a factive inference correlates with the focus structure (or the nature of the
alternatives) of the sentence. If the verb itself is focussed as in (18)b, or it stands with a
perfective prefix (18)a, it tends to trigger a factive inference. If however, something else
in the sentence than the verb is focussed, the inference disappears (19)27:
(18) factive implication:
a. P6ter EL.mondta Janosnak hogy Mari megevett 6t almit. (Did he tell him?)
Peter PRF.told Janos that Mari ate five apples
b. P6ter MONDTA J nosnak hogy Mari megevett it almdt (Did he tell him?)
Peter TOLD Janos that Mari ate five apples
(19) no factive implication:
a. P6ter AZT modta Janosnak hogy Mari megevett it almit (What did he tell him?)
Peter THAT told Janos that Mari ate five apples
b. PETER mondta Jainosnak hogy Mari megevett it almit (Who told him that?)
PETER told Janos that Mari ate five apples
c. P6ter JANOSNAK mondta hogy Mari megevett it almit (Who did he tell it to?)
Peter TO-JANOS told that Mari ate five apples
27 In the case of the perfective version of tell however (elmond), the inference remains regardless of the
focus structure.
In the case of questions the focus structure is typically hijacked by wh-movement, as the
wh-word moves into the focus position, but the presence of the perfective prefix still
invokes a factive inference. Interestingly, if the particle is present, wh-movement of the
degree phrase is not possible, however, it seems to be (nearly) acceptable if the particle is
not present:
(20) a. ?Hainy almdt mondott Mari P6temek hogy Gibor megevett?
b. *Hainy almit mondott el Mari P6ternek hogy Gdbor megevett?
How many apples told (prt) Mari to Peter that Gabor ate?
That the above is probably not simply an example of lexical ambiguity of tell correlating
with the prefix might be shown by questions in which the verb is still focussed (which is
possible in emphatic contexts):
(21) a. ?(Ertem, de,) Kit MONDOTT Janos Gibomak hogy Mari meghivott?
(I understand but) who TOLD Janos to-Gabor that Mari invited?
(ok, but I want to know:) Who did John TELL Gabor that Mari invited?
b. *(Ertem, de,)Hany almit MONDOTT Jainos Gibornak hogy Mari megevett?
(I understand but) How many apples TOLD Janos to-Gabor that Mari ate?
(ok, but I want to know:) How many apples did John TELL Gabor that Mari ate?
Although the above discussion is extremely preliminary at this stage, but if it is on the
right track, it might provide an interesting step towards showing that indeed the island-
creating behavior of the interveners in question depends on nothing other than their
factive inference2 .
28 And, even more speculatively, that the factive inference and thus the intervention property of factive
verbs might be ultimately reduced to focus itself...
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3 Response stance predicates
We know from Cattell (1978) Hegarty (1992), Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993),Honcoop
(1998), that the class of verbs that create weak islands also includes response stance
verbs (in Cattell's terminology). Though not factive, these verbs are normally uttered in
response to something that is assumed to be part of the common ground or to something
that someone proposed to update the common ground with:
(22) *How did Bill deny that John fixed the car?
(23) response stance verbs: deny, verify, admit, confirm, accept, acknowledge
These verbs are presuppositional in the sense that they "presuppose that their
complements express assumptions or claims held by someone possibly other than the
speaker which are part of the common ground" (Honcoop (1998) p.167) [A more
suggestive --though perhaps also confusing-- way could be to say that in a sense the
situation is as if p was in the purgatory of common ground: p was proposed but not
accepted yet]:
(24) x denied that p
presupposes: it is assumed by someone that p
Can the reasoning above as for why factive verbs create weak islands be extended to
response stance verbs? Observe first the behavior of a question about individuals as
below:
(25) Which of these 3 terrorists did Nero deny/admit that he executed?
Inference: someone(we?) believes that they executed these 3 terrorists
Imagine a context in which John believes that Nero executed terrorist 1 and noone else,
Bill believes that Nero executed terrorist 2 and noone else, and Mark believes that Nero
executed terrorist 3 and noone else, and noone else, including the speaker, has any beliefs
about the matter whatsoever. I believe that the above questions sounds rather odd in such
a scenario, because it suggests something much stronger: namely that some people,
perhaps including the speaker, believe that Nero executed all three terrorists. It seems
then that the above question requires a contextually given (plural) individual whose
assumptions are in question, in other words the individuals whose assumptions are in
question do not vary with the propositions in the Hamblin denotation. While I am not
entirely clear about how exactly this inference arises, I will take that it can be maintained
that indeed the presupposition of the question above regards the beliefs of a single
contextually salient body.
The alternatives in the Hamblin denotation of a question such as (22) will stand
with the presupposition that refers to the beliefs of a discourse referent. Now, when we
try to select a complete answer such as the one in (22) we will invariably derive that any
answer presupposes that the discourse referent in question has contradictory beliefs.
(26) (22) Presupposes:
3x. for every manner a in the domain, x believes that John fixed the car in a
It is easy to see that in the case of degree questions with response-stance predicates a
similar contradictory set of presuppositions will be created, much in the same way as we
have seen above with factive predicates. Indeed, the whole situation that arises with
response-stance predicates is very similar to that we have seen with factive verbs, the
only difference is in the holder of the inconsistent beliefs. In both of these cases, we
derive that a complete answer presupposes that there is an individual whose beliefs we
know to be incoherent. Yet, this cannot be a felicitous context for asking a question.
4 Extraposition Islands
The third group of presupositional islands are islands created by extraposition, such as
(27) below. Following a tradition in the literature, I discuss this group separately, but in
fact they belong in the previous section: whether or not extraposition creates weak islands
depends on the factivity of the verb/noun involved. (That extraposition and factives form
the same class of interveners is also assumed e.g. in Honcoop (1998)) When the
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extraposition is based on a noun/adjective that triggers a factive inference, the
extraposition creates a weak island context, as shown below:
(27) *How was it a surprise that John behaved?
(28) It was a surprise that John behaved politely
presupposes: (the speaker believes that) John behaved politely
On the occasions that extraposition is not based on an adjective that has a factive
inference, it does not give rise to Weak Islands either 29:
(29) a. How is it possible that John behaved?
b. How much wine is it dangerous to drink at a party?
example due to Postal, cited in Szabolcsi (2006)
In some cases, though not factive, the extraposition might stand with a presupposition
akin to that of response-stance predicates, in that it presupposes that someone believes the
truth of the complement. I believe that this is the case in (30) below: Therefore, the
analysis offered for response-stance verbs should carry over to this case.
(30) *How is it true that Bill behaved?
(31) It is true that p:
presupposes: Someone believes p
asserts: p
A further similarity of this example to response-stance predicates will be pointed out
shortly in Section 6, where I will note that an existential quantifier seems to improve
islands created by response stance predicates. This seems to be true of the present
example as well:
29 One exception in the literature to the above claim is the example from Cinque (1990):
(1) *How is it time to behave?
I do not have an explanation for this fact.
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(32) ?How might it be true that Bill behaved?
However, before we turn to examining why this should be the case, let's take a look at
islands created by adverbs.
5 Adverbial interveners
In this section I would like to tentatively propose that adverbial interveners in fact belong
to the group of presuppositional islands. This is in contrast with most (indeed, all) of the
literature on this topic, who claim that (quantificational) adverbial interveners argue for
treating weak island intervention in terms of scope (e.g. Kiss (1993), de Swart (1992),
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993), Honcoop (1998)). However, I believe that rather than scope
restrictions, the real culprit is again presuppositions. Linebarger (1981), and more
recently Simons (2001) and Schlenker (2006a) note that adverbs give rise to "quasi-
presuppositions", i.e. in some circumstances they create inferences that project in a
presupposition-like fashion:
(33) Bill ran fast
-Inference: Bill ran
The projection properties of this inference seems to pattern with that of real
presuppositions, at least in some circumstances:
(34) None of these ten boys ran fast
Inference: all of these ten boys ran
(35) None of these ten boys solved the exercise twice.
Inference: all of these ten boys solved the exercise
de Swart (1992) has noted that while weak island contexts are more typically created by
DE quantifiers (cf. the next section of this chapter, as well as the section on "Scope
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Islands" of Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)), with adverbs of quantification weak island
phenomena arise regardless whether they are upwards or downwards monotonic30:
(36) *Combien as-tu beaucoup/souvent/peu/rarement consult6 de livres? (French)
how many have you a lot/often/a little/ rarely consulted of books
'How many books have you consulted a lot/often/a little/ rarely ?'
Not only split constructions seem to be sensitive to adverbial interveners, as the example
(37) from den Dikken and Szabolcsi (2002) shows. We might also add (38):
(37) ???How did you behave a lot?
(38) ???How much milk did John spill on his shirt often?
Non-quantification adverbs have been claimed by Obenauer (1984) to not give rise to
intervention:
(39) ?Combien le douanier a-t-il soigneusement fouill6 de valises?
How-many the customs-officer has-he carefully searched the suitcases?
However, it seems that not all adverbs behave in a uniform way with respect to the
combien-split. (at least the Hungarian equivalent of) the example in (41) seems to be
quite bad as well:
(40) *Combien Marie a-t-elle vite mang6 de gateaux? 31
How many Marie has-she fast ate of cakes
30 Generic contexts however seem to rescue adverbial intervention: (data from de Swart (1992))
(1) Combien as-tu toujours voulu avoir d'enfants?
How many have you always wanterd to have children
(2) Combien pr6pares-tu g6n6ralement de toasts pour le petit d6jeuner?
31 But:
(3) Combien Marie a-t-elle mang6 de pop tarts vite?
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(41) ???How much milk did Mary spill unexpectedly?
If these facts are real, then they might in fact be rather problematic to any account that
tries to explain them on the basis of scope or quantificationality. We might notice
however that the difference in grammaticality of the various examples seems to correlate
with how strongly they induce quasi-presuppositions:
(42) No one read the books twice
-everyone read the books
(43) No one ate the pop-tarts fast
-everyone ate pop-tarts
(44) No one searched the bags carefully
???-everyone searched the bags
It seems that quantification adverbs and some other adverbs like late, fast, etc are more
prone to triggering a "quasi-presupposition" than other adverbs: e.g. carefully does not
seem to trigger a presupposition in the same fashion. The difference is probably triggered
not so much by the particular adverbs, but rather by the interaction of the context and the
content of the whole sentence.
If this is on the right track, then in fact we might argue that the reason why
adverbs seem to cause intervention is because they tend to trigger "quasi-
presuppositions". And while such "quasi-presuppositons" are not yet well understood, we
might expect any solution to them carry over to explain the weak island-causing behavior
of some adverbs. Given this factive inference, the reason why wh-constructions that
contain adverbs are sensitive to weak islands will be very similar to what we have seen
above in the case of factive, response stance and extraposition islands. Further, as adverbs
do not seem to be uniform in the strength of the quasi-presupposition they invoke, this
analysis has the capacity to predict a certain amount of variation with respect to
individual adverbs. This might be a welcome result, because even quantificational
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adverbs do not seem to be particularly robust interveners in general (except in split-
constructions).
6 Islands created by only
This section examines islands created by only NPs. I will first provide a simple account
based on the strong presupposition of only. In the following section I note that that this
presupposition however is not without its problems, in particular it might be argued to be
too strong. I will then proceed to show one particular way in which the basic account
could be carried over, even if such a weaker presupposition to only were to be proved.
6.1 A first view: The strong presuppositional analysis of only
At first blush it might seem that the reasoning based on contradictory presuppositions
might be easily extended to the intervention created by only: if, as was proposed by Horn
(1969) only AB presupposed the truth of AB, we would easily derive a contradiction. This
is because if, as was argued earlier in this chapter, presupposition projection from
complete answers is universal, then any manner or degree question would be predicted to
stand with a set of contradictory presuppositions. Take e.g. a question such as (45). In
this case, as I have argued in chapter 2, the manner alternatives might be restricted, yet
any set will al least contain 3 contraries, for example if our context is restricted to the
dimension of politeness, our set of propositions in the Hamblin set might look as in (46):
(45) *How did only John behave?
(46) [*How did only John behave?]
={that only John behaved politely,
that only John behaved impolitely,
that only John behaved neither politely nor impolitely },
If all of these alternatives presupposed the prejacent that only combines with (in our case
that John behaved politely, that John behaved impolitely, that John behaved neither
politely nor impolitely), then by universal projection we would derive that such a question
should trigger contradictory presuppositions. As is easy to see, a similar reasoning could
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also be extended to questions about degrees, as in this case the alternative would be based
on the various intervals that do not necessarily have to overlap.
6.2 A second view: the weak presuppositional analysis
One potential objection for the above outlined explanation as to why only creates
intervention might come from the arguments that seem to show that the above proposed
presupposition for only might too strong. The first problem, observed by Horn (1996),
Geurts and van der Sandt (2004) is that the putative presupposition does not project in
modalized sentences:
(47) It is possible that only the Red Sox can beet the Yankees, and maybe not even
they can.
The second problem, also observed by Horn (1996) is manifested by the fact that the
following question-answer exchange is felicitous:
(48) A: Who can beat the Yankees?
B: Only the Red Sox.
The above authors therefore have suggested a weak presuppositional analysis. The
sentence such as only Muriel voted for Hubert triggers the inference that Muriel voted for
Hubert is true. However, according to the above authors this inference comes about as a
combination of the truth conditional meaning of only and an existential presupposition 32
Thus:
(49) Only [Muriel]F voted for Hubert
presupposes: Someone voted for Hubert
Asserts: No one other than Muriel voted for Hubert
-inference: Muriel voted for Hubert
32 This view, however, as e.g. Ippolito (2006) argues is also not without its problems: e.g. it does not
predict the correct inference for a sentence such as Only John and Mary ate cookies. Cf. also the discussion
in Roberts (2006).
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Exactly what the source of the existential presupposition is, i.e. whether it is triggered by
focus Geurts and van der Sandt (2004), or (also) by only itself Beaver (2004), or by the
existential import of a universal quantification Horn (1996) is a matter of ongoing debate.
Yet whatever the source of this presupposition might be, the problem we have now that
this weaker presupposition is not strong enough to derive a contradiction. Take a look at
(46) again: if each alternative in the Hamblin set only presupposes that someone behaved
in a, then in the case of (46) by universal presupposition we derive that a complete
answer should stand with the set of presuppositions: { that someone behaved politely, that
someone behaved impolitely, that someone behaved neither politely nor impolitely]. In
other words the offending contraries in this case would be distributed over various
individuals, and therefore the contradiction would be avoided.
6.3 The presupposition of only in negative sentences
Interestingly, as Geurts and van der Sandt (2004) point out, in negative sentences like
(50) the presupposition seems to be stronger, as if only AB indeed presupposed the truth
of AB, as was originally proposed in Horn (1969).
(50) Not only Muriel voted for Hubert presupposes: Muriel voted for Hubert
The reason why this inference is not a conversational implicature is that it seems to
project, as shown by (51):
(51) It is possible that not only Muriel voted for Hubert
Beaver (2004) shows that this stronger presupposition in the case of negative sentences
can be derived if we assume that under negation the whole phrase only Muriel is
focussed, and the focus alternatives of an only NP are itself and the NP without only. If
focus stands with the presupposition that one of the focus-alternatives is true, (50) is
correctly predicted to presuppose that Muriel voted for Hubert.
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6.4 [Only NP] is focussed in questions
Should the weak-presuppositional analysis turn out to be correct for only, we could still
adopt a similar analysis to only NP's in questions. But is the prediction that in questions
we again see the stronger presupposition of only correct? Let's look at a question about
individuals containing an only NP phrase:
(52) Which exercise did only John solve?
The presupposition in Horn (1996) predicts that a complete answer to the above question
of the form Only John solved Exl should be understood as (53)a, while the stronger
presupposition according to Horn (1969) predicts the meaning of a complete answer
together with its presuppositions as in (53)b:
(53)
(a) John and noone else solved Ex.1 and for all the other exercises in the given domain,
some (other) people solved them.
(b) John and noone else solved Ex.1 and for all the other exercises in the given domain,
John and other people solved them.
It seems to me that the reading that complete answer to the above question such as Only
John solved Exlgets is certainly much stronger than that in (53)a, in particular a complete
answer stands with the inference that in fact John has solved many other excercises than
Ex1. For this reason, I will assume that indeed in questions Only NP phrases tend to get
focussed, similarly to what Beaver (2004) has suggested for negative sentences. Thus
(54) is in fact understood as below, and a complete answer is exemplified in (55):
(54) Which exercise did [only John]F solve?
(55) IIExhlIw (II(52)11)(Xw. only John solved exercise 1 in w)
= Only John solved exercise 1 in w &
Vqe {Xw. [only John]F solved exercise x in w I xe {De-{Ex 1*} }. q(w)=0
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presupposition: Vxe De. John solved x in w
assertion: no one other than John solved Ex 1 & Vxe {De-{Ex 1*1. someone other
than John solved exercise x in w
With this background a manner and degree questions are again predicted to give rise to
contradictory presuppositions, just as I have outlined it a few paragraphs above. E.g. a
manner question such as the one in (45) above will be now understood as having focus on
the constituent [only John] a la Beaver (2004). This way, we derive that in a situation
such as in (46) a complete answer will presuppose that { that John behaved politely, that
John behaved impolitely, that John behaved neither politely nor impolitely]. This is
however a contradictory set of propositions, and as such, it cannot be satisfied in any
context. Another example might be provided by (56) below:
(56) ok/*How has only John solved the exercise?
Suppose we are math teachers conversing and we agree that there are 4 different
plausible solutions to the exercise under discussion. The question in (56) still sounds
infelicitous, except if the assignment was in fact that everyone should try to solve the
exercise in as many different ways they can. In this case however, the question is
acceptable: and this is because the perfect tense makes it plausible that we might be
talking about a number of different solving events. The importance of this example is that
since it has a reading under which it is acceptable, we can now tap into the causes of what
has been behind the unacceptability in other cases. Here we see that the question comes
with the implication that John solved the exercise in many ways, which is an implausible
assumption, unless in our very special context. However, once this very special context is
in place, the question is good.
6.5 Exactly one
Contrast now the behavior of only with that of exactly one:
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(57) How did exactly one girl think that you behaved?
Because exactly one is not presuppositional, for an answer such as Exactly one girl
thought you behaved politely to be assertable as a complete answer, nothing else need to
be taken into account than its assertive component. In this case this will be that exactly
one girl thinks that you behaved politely, and for every manner in the domain other than
politely, it is not true that exactly one girl thinks that you behaved that way. But this
requirement is easily satisfied, even in a context where no one thinks anything except for
the one girl who thought you behaved politely. Hence, quantifiers such as exactly one are
not predicted to cause any intervention effects. As the acceptability of (57) shows, this is
indeed the case.
7 How to rescue presuppositional islands
When we look at instances of weak island violations and contemplate the reasons for
their unacceptability, it is equally instructive to look at contexts which might in fact
remedy these violations. In this section I will show that presuppositional islands can be
rescued by context restriction, or negation under the factive verb. Response stance verbs
can also be saved by an existential modal.
7.1 Context restriction
Context restriction can come to the rescue of presuppositional islands, just as other weak
islands, observe the example below:
(58) Situation: We all know and agree that yesterday the president behaved
irresponsibly and incompetently:
How did they regret/deny that the president behaved: irresponsibly or
incompetently?
The explanation of this fact is straightforward: by explicitly restricting the domain to a
small set of manners, we can avoid the conclusion that someone holds contradictory
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beliefs. Observe however the choice of the domain does matter: if the domain we choose
contains contrary predicates, we still predict ungrammaticality:
(59) *How do you regret that John fixed the car: quickly or slowly?
This is because this question requires from the addressee to believe that John fixed the
car slowly and that he fixed the car quickly, regardless of the actual answer given. Thus
domain restriction in the case of factive islands is only helpful as long as the domain of
manners does not contain contrary predicates.
7.2 Modals and response stance verbs
It seems that weak islands with response stance predicates improve if they are embedded
under an existential modal:
(60) *How did you verify that the president behaved_?
(61) How can you verify that the president behaved_?
(62) * How must you verify that the president behaved__?
(63) How are you allowed to admit that the president behaved?
Why should this be? I believe what is happening in this case is that the existential modal
in fact acts as binder for the individual variable as well 33, and hence now the
presuppositions of the propositional alternatives will not invoke a discourse referent any
more.
(64) IIExhjIw (1I(61)11)(Xw. yw'Acc(w,w') ou verify that the president behaved properly
in w')
presupposition: For every manner in the domain, 3w'Acc(w,w') 3x. x believes that
the president behaved properly in w'
33 Thanks to Irene Heim for suggesting this solution.
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In this case however the propositions that contain contraries are distributed over different
individuals, and in this way we avoid the contradiction. Notice that with real factives of
the regret-type of course the individual whose beliefs are in question is fixed to the
subject: therefore we do not predict that inserting an existential modal should bring any
improvement: This prediction is indeed borne out34:
(65) a.
b.
???How might Bill regret that John behaved?
???How might he realize that John behaved?
34 E. Chemla (pc.) points out that according to my reasoning modals under negation should improve these
sentences. It is not clear to me at this point what the facts are.
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Chapter 5
Further Issues
1 Introduction
This chapter contains a couple of sketches of ideas about two main topics. The first part,
(Section 2) is concerned with tenseless whether-complements. The second part (Section
3) discusses a number of interesting issues that the present account predicts for
quantificational interveners.
2 Weak Islands created by tenseless wh-complements
In the previous chapters I have only been concerned with the property of the domain of
manners and degrees that it contains contraries. Now, I will also turn to a second property
of the proposal advanced in this thesis about the domain of manners and degrees, namely
that these domains in a sense always fully "exhaust the logical space". Therefore it is not
possible to be opinionated about all-but-one alternative, because the truth of any single
alternative is determined by the truth /falsity of the other alternatives. This will be the
main problem with weak islands created by tenseless wh-complements. In particular, in
this part I will look at islands created by whether-complements of wonder. A disclaimer
is in order at this point: one aspect that I will not discuss here is the role of tense, in other
words why is it that the presence of overt tense marking turns these islands into strong
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islands in many languages 35. I will assume that this is a consequence of an independent
factor that creates strong-islands. However, what I will look at is the difference that I
predict between questions about individuals on the one hand, and questions about
manners and degrees on the other hand, independently of the contribution of tense. I will
assume that this reasoning can be extended in a straightforward manner to the data with
infinitival wh-complements. The basic pattern that I aim to explain in this section is that
in (1) below:
(1) a. Which man are you wondering whether to invite _?
b. *How are you wondering whether to behave_?
c. *How many books are they wondering whether to write next year_?
The reasoning that I present below will go as follows: a complete answer to the above
questions will state that x wonders whether p and will imply that for all the alternatives q
to p, x is opinionated about q. This causes no problem in the case of individual questions,
because in this case the alternatives are independent from each other. In other words the
truth of any individual alternative does not have a consequence for the rest of the
alternatives (modulo pluralities, of course). However, in the case of alternative
propositions that are based on manners and degrees, the alternatives are not independent:
the truth or falsity of one alternative might obligatorily imply the truth or falsity of
another alternative (again, quite independently of the possibility of forming pluralities in
the case of manners). This is because of what we know about the certain manner
alternative being contraries to each other, or certain intervals not overlapping. I will show
that therefore in the case of degrees and manners it is not possible to be opinionated about
all-but-one alternatives, without being opinionated about all of the alternatives as well.
This is because the truth or falsity of all the alternatives except one will uniquely
determine the truth or falsity of the last alternative as well. Yet a complete answer to the
unacceptable questions above will be predicted to state exactly this impossible state of
35 The data on tensed constituent wh-complements seems to show a lot of cross-linguistic and cross-speaker
variation. E.g. Szabolcsi (2006) reports sentences such as (1) below to be acceptable in Hungarian, but not
in English or Dutch for most speakers.
(1) ???Which men did John ask whether Bill invited?
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affairs: that the speaker is not opinionated about only one alternative in the Hamblin set,
and opinionated about all the rest of the question alternatives.
Consider a basic case of an embedded yes-no question such as (2) below:
(2) John wonders whether it is raining
I will assume that a verb like wonder asserts that the speaker does not believe any of the
alternatives of the embedded question:36
(3) x Wonders {p,-p } (e.g., John wonders whether it's raining).
Asserts: -- x believes p A - x believes (-p);
In other words: x is not opinionated about p.
We are now interested in looking at a situation where there is movement out of an
embedded yes/no question. In the case of questions about individuals the Hamblin
denotation will look as follows:
(4) [Which man are you wondering whether to invite?]
= {you are wondering { invite Bill , - invite Bill)
you are wondering {invite John, - invite John}
you are wondering {invite Fred, - invite Fred) }
Given the lexical meaning of wonder above, (4) is equivalent to (5) below:
(5) { - you believe (you invite Bill) A -- you believe (-, you invite Bill)
- you believe (you invite John) A -- you believe (-n you invite John)
-- you believe (you invite Fred) A -- you believe (- you invite Fred) }
36 I am basing the formulation of this entry on Chemla (2007), but I believe that this is fact a standard
assumption about the lexical entry for wonder, cf. e.g. Lahiri (2002).
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A complete answer to the above question such as "You are wondering whether to invite
Bill", stands with the inference that the speaker is already opinionated about the rest of
the alternatives 37. This inference arises because of the equivalence in (6):
(6) -[ - you believe (you invite John) A - you believe (-- you invite John)]
= you believe (you invite John) v you believe (- you invite John)
As a consequence, asserting a complete answer will state the following:
(7) -you believe (you invite Bill) A -- you believe (- you invite Bill)
A [you believe (you invite John) v you believe (- you invite John)]
A [ you believe (you invite Fred) v you believe (- you invite Fred)]
In the case of individuals thus no problem arises as a consequence of the inference in (6).
However, in the case of questions about manners and degrees, the situation is different.
The problem arises from the fact that the alternatives to these questions are not
independent from each other; in other words, they, in a sense "exhaust the logical space".
Therefore it is not really possible to be opinionated about all-but-one alternative, because
the truth of the leftover alternative is determined by the truth/falsity of the other
alternatives:
Let's look at manner questions such as (8) first:
(8) *How are you wondering whether to behave?
= {you are wondering {behave politely , - behave politely}
you are wondering {behave impolitely , -7 behave impolitely}
you are wondering {behave neither way, - behave neither way}
37 Alternatively, this inference might be weakened to the inference that the speaker does not care about the
rest of the alternatives. However, such weakening is not a coherent position in the case of manner and
degree questions.
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Given the lexical meaning of wonder this is again equivalent to the meaning represented
below:
(9) { you believe (you behave politely) A -- you believe (- you behave politely)
- you believe (you behave impolitely) A -- you believe (-- you behave impolitely)
- you believe (you behave neither way) A -- you believe (- you behave neither way) }
By a parallel reasoning to what we have seen in the discussion of questions about
individuals above, asserting a complete answer such as you are wondering whether to
behave politely will imply (10):
(10) -you believe (you behave politely) A -- you believe (-- you behave politely)
A [you believe (you behave impolitely) v you believe (- you behave impolitely)]
A [ you believe (you behave neither) v you believe (- you behave neither )]
This is because the by now very familiar assumption that any domain of manners will at
least include contraries of each manner, as well as a "middle" (=neither, in some other
way) manner. As a consequence, "the space of possibilities" is divided into 3 in the way
illustrated below. However, as it will become immediately clear, as these manners are all
exclusive (i.e. no event can fall under more than one of them), it is not possible to be
opinionated about any two of these, without in fact being opinionated about the third:
(11) # ? I y/n I y/n
politely impolitely neither politely nor impolitely
Therefore, what any complete answer to a question such as (8) will state is not a possible
state of mind, so to speak: Having an opinion about whether the event under discussion
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was impolite and/or neither polite nor impolite in fact completely determines whether it
was polite or not.38
A moment of reflection shows that exactly the same issue arises in the case of
questions about degrees, such as the one below:
(12) How many books are you wondering whether to write?
If we reason in terms of the interval semantics introduced in chapter 3, then the above
question is predicted to mean the following:
(13) For which interval, you are wondering whether the number of books you write is
in that interval?
Unfortunately however it is not a possible state of affairs for there to be one interval
about which one can truly wonder whether the number of books you will write is in it,
while being opinionated about all other intervals (more precisely about all the other
intervals that are not contained in the target interval).
3. Quantifiers in questions
In this second part of the chapter, I will be looking at examples such as the ones below:
(14) How tall is every boy?
(15) ???How much did some girls score?
(16) How much milk have you never spilled on your shirt?
(17) How much did no one score?
(18) ???How did few/less than 3 girls behave at the party?
38 Note that it is also not a coherent position however not to care about the alternatives impolitely or neither
in this case. This is because the complement set of polite events will include the impolite and the neither
polite nor impolite manners. Therefore, if one cares about the complement of the polite manners, (which is
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(19) How did only a few girls behave at the party?
(20) How did at most 3 girls behave at the party?
Some of the above examples (e.g. (17), (18)) have been traditionally discussed as
examples of weak island violations (e.g. Rizzi (1990)), who proposed that operators that
license NPI's are interveners. (The terminology sometimes used in the literature after
Klima (1964) is affective operators, the more current terminology would be (Strawson)
DE operators.) It has been noted however, that not all DE operators cause intervention on
the one hand, and on the other hand, that certain upward entailing quantifiers cause
intervention as well.
Among the non-downward entailing quantifiers that cause intervention most
prominent perhaps were the examples with universal quantifiers such as (14), made
famous by Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) (cf. also de Swart (1992), Kiss (1993)). This
question can be understood as a pair-list question, or asking for the unique number such
that every boy read exactly that number. Yet there is a missing reading, with everyone
taking narrow scope: The sentence cannot have the reading 'what is the height such that
every boy is tall to at least that degree?'. A second set of data with upward entailing
quantifiers consists of examples such as (21) and (22) below. These have been sometimes
noted to cause intervention as well (e.g. in Honcoop (1998), and contra Szabolcsi and
Zwarts (1993)), however, they were not grouped together with weak island creating
environments, for the reason that questions about individuals seem to be sensitive to these
environments as well, as shown by the examples from Honcoop (1998):
(21) ???How many children do some women have?
(22) ?How did a man behave?
(23) ?Which book did a student read?
(24) ?Which book did 3 students read?
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asserted by the answer), then one necessarily cares about the impolite and neither polite nor impolite
manners.
I will argue however that in fact the above examples belong to the present discussion as
the oddness of even the examples with individuals might be argued to follow from
maximalization failure.
As concerning the downward entailing quantifiers, while negative quantifiers
such as no one are traditionally listed in the group of weak island creating operators, in
fact in many contexts these seem to be perfectly acceptable. Similarly, Szabolcsi and
Zwarts (1993) discusses the case of at most as in (20), noting that most people find it
acceptable. Furthermore, it seems to me that there is also a marked difference btw. (18)
and (19), the latter being acceptable for most people, even though they both involve DE
interveners.
In this section I first look at the case of universal quantifiers in questions and
point out an interesting connection that an interval semantics for degree expressions
predicts to a scope puzzle that can be found in the domain of comparatives. Then turn to
the case of DE operators such as noone, and show why the present analysis predicts these
to be acceptable in fact. Finally in the last part I discuss the case of upward entailing
operators such as some and other quantifiers like few vs. only afew.
3.1. The scope puzzle
de Swart (1992), Kiss (1993), Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) point out an unexpected
property of degree questions that contain certain quantifiers. The interesting property of
these questions is that they do not seem to have the reading in (25)b below, namely the
reading where the universal quantifier takes scope under the wh-word. The readings the
question seems to have are the pair list reading in (25)a, and what these authors call
"independent scope", the reading that presupposes that everyone has the same height.
(25) How tall is every boy?
(d) 'For every boy x, how tall is every x ?'
(e) '#For what d, every boy is at least d-tall?'
(f) 'What is the uniform degree of height such that everyone is exactly that tall?'
The above authors take this fact to show that these intervening quantifiers in fact also
create weak islands, as they prevent certain wh-words from taking scope above them. The
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missing reading is clearly predicted by the approaches that specify an 'at least' reading
for numerals in degree expressions. An account that would take the exact readings to be
basic would not predict this reading. Let's look at the interval-based account. At first
sight, it could seem that the interval account might make exactly the right prediction:
(26) [How tall is every boy?]=
= for what interval I. for every boy x, the height of x e I
= for every x, the height of x el I II DI}
We are looking for the smallest interval that contains for every x, the height of x. If
everyone is tall to the same degree d, then this interval will be the singleton set of degrees
{d}. If however, various people have different heights, then we are looking for the
smallest interval that contains these degrees. Let's take for example the case that some
people are 5 feet tall, others 5.5 and yet others 6. In this case the smallest such interval
will be [5,6] and the answer should be "between 5 and 6 feet":
(27) -------- [5---5.5---6]----------------
I believe that this is also a possible reading (to the extent the pair-list reading is
possible), though not always easy to get. It would seem then that the above approach does
not predict the existence of the reading in (25)b.
However, if we assume the existence of the H-operator as it was argued in chapter
3 that we probably should, we loose the above account. This is because if now the H-
operator can scope above everyone, then in fact the existence of the missing reading is
predicted, after all:
(28) for what I .I [r. Xd everyone is d-tall]
={ max(Xd. everyone is d-tall)eI I IeD})
the maximal degree such that everyone's height is at least that
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At the same time, Benjamin Spector (pc.) points out that questions that contain universal
modals like the one below seem to be able to get the 'at least' reading:
(29) How tall are you sure that every basketball player was?
This fact again might be explained by assuming that the NI-operator might take scope
above the modal. If this is so, then an interesting generalization seems to emerge
according to which the N-operator can take wide scope above a modal to derive the 'at
least' reading of (29) above, but not above a universal quantifier as in (25). While I have
no explanation for this, the intriguing fact to observe is that Heim (2006) arrives at an
identical restriction concerning the scope of the N-operator in comparatives: it has to be
able to take scope above a modal, but it cannot be allowed to take wide scope above a
quantifier over individuals. 39
(30) John is taller than every girl is.
a. Actual meaning: 'for every girl x: John is taller than x'
b. Missing reading : 'John is taller than the degree d such that every girl is
tall to that degree d. '
(31) John is faster than he needs to be.
a. Actual reading: 'John is faster than the degree d such that in every
accessible world he is at least that fast"
Thus while the analysis based on intervals does not yet solve the problem at hand, at least
it is able to offer an interesting connection to an already existing puzzle.
3.2 No one
In Chapter 3 I have shown that in the case of negative islands there was no context in
which there was a maximally informative answer. At the same time, certain modals were
able to obviate the negative island effect-this was the pattern noted in Fox and Hackl
(2005). More precisely, what we have seen was that in the cases where modals were able
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to rescue the negative island violations, there was at least one world in which there was a
most informative answer. For example, in the case of a question such as (32) below, there
was a situation, in which this question could receive a complete answer. Suppose we had
a scenario such as the one illustrated in (33): this is a situation where one is allowed to
have 1,2,3,or 4 children, but not more. In this case the interval [5,oo) was the unique
maximal interval, such that it did not contain any degree that would have corresponded to
the number of children that you were allowed to have. (Recall that I was assuming that
the scale of degrees could be either discreet or dense, as required by our world
knowledge. This parameter did not make any difference for our reasoning. In this case, I
assume the scale is discreet.)
(32) How many children are you not allowed to have?
(33) dwl dw2 dw3 dw4 [-------- {--(----------------)---]--------
But it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the question in (32) would not have a
maximal answer in the interval-based system I was proposing. For example imagine that
in the far away kingdom of Antiprimia, what is not allowed is having a prime number of
children. Clearly in this case there will be no unique interval covering all and only the
degrees that correspond to the number of children that one is not allowed to have. Still, I
was arguing, the question is grammatical: Our reasoning based on Gajewski (2002) only
predicted that a question will be ungrammatical if there is no context in which it can have
a most informative answer. The question in (32) can have such a context, e.g. the one
illustrated in (33), therefore it is grammatical. 40 In contrast, in the case of a simple
negative question such as *How many children don't you have? there was no scenario in
which it could have a maximal answer.
39 But cf. Takahashi (2006) on questions about the validity of this generalization
40 How do I predict that it seems to be possible to answer: "Any prime number."? We might follow Fox and
Hackl (2005) at this point, who propose that Dayal (1996)'s condition might have to be weakened to state
that it is possible that the conjunction of all true propositions in Q is itself a member of Q.
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Similarly to modals, certain quantifiers over individuals can also rescue negative
degree questions if it is possible to find scenarios in which it is possible to find a maximal
interval. Let's take a question such as (34) below:
(34) [How many books did none of the students read?]
= {-3x [student(x) A x read I-many books] I IeDI}
Imagine a situation in which there are four students, and they read 1,2,3 and 4 books
respectively. In this case indeed there can be a maximal interval that contains all the
intervals that do no contain any degrees such that a student read that many books: the
interval [5, oo) i.e. at least 5. The picture below should serve as an illustration:
(35) ds ds2 ds3 ds4 [-------- {--(-------------)--)---]------
Another scenario in which the question might have a most informative answer is a
scenario in which various students have read all numbers of books, except it so happens
that no one read 5: in this case the only interval for which it is not true that someone read
a number of books that is contained in this interval is the interval which corresponds to
the singleton set { d5 }, exactly 5.
(36) dsl ds2 ds3 ds4 [ds] ds6 ds7 dss ds9...
Let's look now at the case of manner questions such as the examples below:
(37) How has John never behaved at a party?
(38) a. How hasn't anyone solved the exercise?
b. ?How has no one solved the exercise?
An interesting aspect of these examples is that they are not only much better than the core
cases of negative island violations with manners, but also we can observe that an answer
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to them seems to have a rather specific meaning. In particular, an answer to (38) 'by
subtraction' is acceptable if in a given contest, there are a number of ways of solving the
exercise that we know about, and for all the other salient methods other than subtraction,
at least one person solved the exercise in that way. Where does this requirement come
from?
First observe what the explanation of these examples might be: I would like to
propose that similarly to the case of modals above, what happens in these examples is
that the mutually exclusive propositions get distributed over different times (in the case
of yet, never) or they talk about different individuals (as in the case of noone). Lets look
fort at the case of (37).41 [Again, the existential quantification over events is presumably
supplied by the temporal quantifier never]
(39) [How has John never behaved at a party?]
={-t3ttnow3e [behave (t)(e)(John) A qmanner (t)(e)] I qmannereDM}
A complete answer such as 'Politely' will state that politely is the most informative true
answer, and as such it will imply that for all other alternative manners in the question
denotation there was a time and event such that John behaved in that manner at that time.
This then derives at the same time that the question should be non-contradictory and that
it should have its implication. The reason why we avoid contradiction in this case is that
now the offending contraries can hold at different times and events. The way we derive
the implication is by the regular reasoning about the complete answer.
Similarly, in the case of an existential quantifier over individuals the different
mutually exclusive manners are distributed over different individuals: this explains on the
one hand why the contradiction is resolved, and on the other hand why we interpret a
complete answer as implicating that for all the alternative manners of solving the
exercise, someone solved it that way42.
41 I simplify the representation here by not representing the exact tense semantics of these examples.
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(40) [How hasn't anyone solved the exercise?]
={-d3x 3e [solve (e)(x)(the exercise) A qmaner (e)] I qmannerEDM}
3.3 Some, few, only a few, at most.
It has been argued by Rizzi (1990), besides negation DE quantifiers such as few, less than
3 also seem to create weak island effects. Following Klima (1964) these are sometimes
referred to as "affective" operators, more commonly though as (Strawson) DE operators.
However, the generalization that affective operators create weak islands is too broad: At
most n e.g. is downward entailing, licenses NPIs, yet still it does not create weak islands,
as noted by Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993). On the other hand, some upward entailing
existential quantifiers cause intervention as well, is it is the case with some: the examples
below are rather odd (similar judgements are reported in Honcoop (1998))
(41) ??How much did some men score?
In this section I observe that the reasoning based on maximal answers that has been
argued for in this thesis partly explains this pattern: in fact it predicts that the upward
entailing quantifiers should cause intervention, even in questions about individuals. On
the other hand, what the present proposal struggles with at the moment is to predict the
intervention caused by DE existential quantifiers such as few: it predicts that examples
with few and less than 3 intervening should be acceptable just like the examples that
contain the quantifier at most 3 are acceptable. Interestingly, as I will observe, there is a
marked difference between few and only a few, where sentences containing the latter are
markedly better, despite the fact that both of these are DE.
3.3.1. Some
Recall that I have been arguing in Chapter 3 that the semantics of degree questions
should be captured by an interval based semantics of degree, advocated by Schwarzschild
42 It seems that the judgements about the examples with no one are not completely uniform, and some
people find them less than perfect. In fact in the literature sometimes such examples are represented with a
star. I do not have any explanation for this variation at the moment.
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and Wilkinson (2002) and Heim (2006). Under this view, the Hamblin-denotation of (51)
above will look as follows:
(42) ???How much did some girls score?
(43) For what interval I, 3X: Vxe X x's score is in I?
={3X: VxeX x's score is in Ij IeDi}
Given an upward entailing pattern, if an interval I covers interval K, the truth of some
girl's score E K will entail the truth of some girl's scoreE L We are then looking for the
smallest interval such that some girl's score is contained in it. Unfortunately, there will
not be a unique minimal (smallest) interval like that. This is because there will be many
such intervals that contain some girl's scores, without any overlap43.
3.3.2. Few and only a few
It has been argued in the literature that the operators few/ less than 3 (but not at most 3)
induce weak island effects:
(44) a. ?*How many points did few girls score?
b. ??How far did few girls jump?
c. *How did less than 3 girls behave at the party?
Interestingly enough, in Hungarian and in Italian44, adding an only in front of few has an
effect of improving greatly the above violations45:
43 Note that this reasoning in fact extends to questions about individuals as well in this case: these too will
be such that a unique maximal answer is not contained in the Hamblin set: (unless we presuppose that only
one person invited anyone, or that everyone invited exactly the same individuals-however, in either case
the use of someone is not felicitous for independent reasons)
(1) ??Who did someone invite?
a. For which individual Y, 3x: x invited Y?
b. { 3x: x invited a;
3x: x invited b;
3x: x invited a+b}
" Italian judgements courtesy of Giorgio Magri (pc)
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(45) A ???Hiny pontot
How-many point
a. Hiny pontot
How-many point
'How many points
6rt el kev6s liny?
reached PRT few girl
6rt (csak) kev6s lainy el?
reached (only) few girl PRT?
did only few girls reach?'
A. *Quanto poche ragazze hanno segnato?
How much few girls have scored?
b. ?Quanto solo poche ragazze hanno segnato?
How much only few girls have scored?
(47) A. *Hogyan oldotta meg a feladatot kev6s fiti?
How solved PRT the exercise few boy
b. Hogyan oldotta meg (csak) kev6s fiii a feladatot?
How solved PRT (only) few boy the exercise
'How did (only) few boys solve the exercise?'
[Hungarian]
The effect of only on the acceptability of these sentences has not yet been noted to my
knowledge. However, what has been observed, most notably by Szabolcsi and Zwarts
(1993) was that in certain languages (e.g. Hungarian) the violations with affective
operators tend to be less strong, if present at all. I believe that the effect that Szabolcsi
and Zwarts (1993) observe in Hungarian is in fact the same effect as that of adding an
only. This is because Hungarian has a focus marking strategy that is strictly interpreted as
exhaustive (cf. Szabolcsi (1981) and subsequent literature on Hungarian). As such, the
effect of focussing an operator such as few NP in Hungarian might be expected to have
the same effect as adding an only. In the examples that are judged as acceptable in
Hungarian, few NP is invariably focussed. In a language like Italian, focussing does not
replace an explicit only.
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[Hungarian]
(46) [Italian]
45 in English, I am told, "only few" sounds odd, but sentences with "only a few" seem acceptable.(pc. Jon
Gajewski)
3.3.3. A speculation about the explanation of this pattern
The above described pattern of data seems to be quite puzzling: this is because the
semantics of few and only a few seems to be exactly the same. Further, for a downward
entailing pattern the reasoning based on maximal answers does not in fact predict
ungrammaticality. Observe the case of the question below:
(48) How much less than 3 gilrs score?
(49) For what I,-,3X: IXI23 & VxeX x's score is in I?
={-,3X: JXI_3 & Vx X x's score is in I I I D1}
In this case we can have a maximal answer: this is because it is not true that any interval
that contains a score that someone scored will make for a true alternative. E.g. if the
degrees 1,2,3 and 4 are the only degrees such that 3 or more people scored that much, the
interval [5,oo) will emerge as the maximal interval such that not more than 2 people have
scored that much. Of course it is easy to imagine many other configurations that make it
possible for the question to have meaningful maximal answer 46
Nevertheless, in this section I offer some (wild) speculations as to where a
difference betweenfew and only afew might be stemming from, still. The reasoning is as
follows. First, one might point out that quantifiers such as few in Hungarian obligatorily
have to move to the preverbal focus position. (This is following Kiss (2007) e.g., and
unlike Szabolcsi (1995)47).
(50) a. *Mari evett kev6s almlit
Mari ate few apple
46 One might object at this point that this analysis should predict that even a sentence such as the one below
should sound odd, this is because we should predict that every actress was insulted by some paparazzi:
(1) Which actress did few paparazzi insult?
One difference is that while actresses may or may not be insulted by paparazzi, all girls would have to
score something in [0-o), or behave somehow.
47 The disagreement is not about the facts, but whether the PredOp position postulated by Szabolcsi (1995)
which walks and talks like the Focus position, is in fact to be equated with the Focus position. Also, the
focus position can only host one item, therefore, if there are more foci, (or more DE operators) all but one
of them will have to be postverbal.
b. Mari evett egy kev6s almit
Mari ate a few apple
Mari ate a few apples'
c. Mari [Fpkev6s almdt] evett
Mari few apple ate
'Mari ate few apples'
This fact I would take to indicate that the resulting DE meaning in Hungarian as a
combination of an exhaustive operator (the focus) and an upward entailing quantifier akin
to a few. In questions however the focus position is occupied by the question word,
therefore few remains in a postverbal position, where it does not associate with focus
easily at all, and tends to retain its UE meaning, unless it can combine with overt only.
However, the UE meaning leads to a maximalization failure as we saw above. On the
other hand, when we turnfew into only a few, we can ask a meaningful question.
Suppose that in fact the Hungarian pattern might be generalized to other
languages 48. Then we might reason as follows. Let's first look at a degree question such
as (51) below:
(51) *How much did less than 3 girls score?
Recall that I have been arguing in Chapter 3 that the semantics of degree questions
should be captured by an interval based semantics of degree, advocated by Schwarzschild
and Wilkinson (2002) and Heim (2006). Under this view, the Hamblin-denotation of (51)
above will look as follows:
(52) For what interval I, 3X: IXk<3 & Vxe X x's score is in I?
={3X: IXI<3 & VxeX x's score is in II EIDI}
Given an upward entailing pattern, if an interval I covers interval K, the truth of (a) few
girl's score E K will entail the truth of (a) few girl's scoreE L We are then looking for
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the smallest interval such that a few girl's (or less than 3 girls's) score is contained in it.
Unfortuntaley, there will not be a unique minimal interval like that.
However, if we add only, the picture changes:
(53) Hdiny pontot 6rt el csak kevesebb mint 3 hiny?
How many scores reached prt only less than 3 girl?
(54) For what I,--3X: IXJ3 & VxE X x's score is in I?
=(-,3X: JXI_3 & VxeX x's score is in II IeDI}
This now can have a maximal answer: this is because it is not true any more that any
interval that contains a score that someone scored will make for a true alternative. E.g. if
the degrees 1,2,3 and 4 are the only degrees such that 3 or more people scored that much,
the interval [5,oo) will emerge as the maximal interval such that not more than 2 people
have scored that much. Of course it is easy to imagine many other configurations that
make it possible for the question to have meaningful maximal answer49.
(55) dl d2 d3 d4 [-------- -- (----------- -- )---]-
Contrast now the behavior of less than 3 with at most 3. Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993)
reports manner questions to be acceptable with at most, which is indeed what is predicted
by the present account.
(56) How did at most 3 girls behave?
48 How does afew behave in English? According to this reasoning it should cause intervention...
49 One might object at this point that this analysis should predict that even a sentence such as the one below
should sound odd, this is because we should predict that every actress was insulted by some paparazzi:
(2) Which actress did few paparazzi insult?
One difference is that while actresses may or may not be insulted by paparazzi, all girls would have to
score something in [0oo), or behave somehow.
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